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ABSTRACT 
 
Against the Thallasocracy: Fascism and Traditionalism in Alexander Dugin’s  
Neo-Eurasianist philosophy 
 
 
Jonathan Rushbrook 
 
This thesis discusses the ideological makeup of the Russian right wing philosopher Alexander 
Dugin. Tracing Dugin’s ideological influences from early Eurasianism, the European New 
Right and esoteric religious beliefs such as Perennial Traditionalism, the thesis then goes on 
to place Dugin’s body of thought within a larger debate on defining fascism and whether 
Dugin can be considered a fascist. The thesis emphasizes that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist 
imperial project disqualifies him from any typical fascist taxonomy. Instead, Neo-
Eurasianism represents a genuinely unique strain of extreme right wing thought that, though 
shares many similarities with historic fascism, nonetheless cannot be considered fascist due 
to Dugin’s profoundly anti-modern vision and the supranational emphasis of his imperial 
objectives in which Russia plays a major role - but a role that places the Russian nation in a 
greater cultural, geographical, and civilizational identity. Ultimately this thesis contests some 
scholars’ interpretations of Dugin’s worldview as a fundamentally ethnocentric or even racist 
Russian nationalism. Rather, this thesis argues that Dugin holds a fundamentally religious 
understanding of reality that sees nations as manifestations of a spiritual, rather than a 
biological, essence. Thus it precludes Dugin from any purely biological racism. à la National 
Socialism.
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Introduction
	
 
This thesis is an attempt at understanding and classifying the ideas of the Russian 
extreme right wing thinker, Alexander Dugin. The extreme right in Russia is certainly not 
a monolithic political entity. Ideologies are inherently multi-faceted and sometimes 
paradoxical. This is a particularly relevant observation when one researches fringe 
politics. Compared to mainstream politics, fringe political ideologies exist on the 
peripheries of a community's main discursive stage. While mainstream politics work 
within a system of accepted political truisms and modes of conduct, such as accepting the 
legitimacy of the rule of law and the outcome of elections, fringe thinkers often work to 
overturn and replace those accepted norms. Thus, fringe ideologies on the outskirts of 
typical political discourse sometimes maintain that the only means of transforming 
society is through political extremism. This “low” form of peripheral politics is mirrored 
by a form of “high” peripheral politics. Like the “low” type, “high” peripheral politics 
maintains that the current system must fundamentally and drastically change.  While 
sometimes participating in a cult of action and violence, thinkers and ideologues of 
“high” peripheral politics often maintain that the only way to affect true systemic change 
is to alter the dominant culture and worldview of society's elites. This Gramscian 
approach is the hallmark of the European Nouvelle Droite, or New Right which seeks to 
overthrow the dominant liberal culture of the modern West and replace it with an 
Identitarian, often racist, defense of Europe and European culture against what it 
perceives to be the civilization-killing effects of American culture. Similar but not  
identical to the ideologues of the Nouvelle Droite, such as Alain de Benoist and Tomislav 
Sunic is the Russian Eurasianst Alexander Dugin, whose body of ideas is the major 
subject of this work. 
Alexander Dugin has recently risen in popularity as a notable thinker among the 
Russian right. He argues for a “radical centralism” that supports the leadership of 
Vladimir Putin and calls for the territorial expansion of the Russian Federation.1 He has 
admitted to being a follower of Julius Evola, who has himself been described by 
historians as a fascist apologist and reactionary. Furthermore, Dugin has openly accepted 
many of the major tenets of the European New Right such as the rejection of liberalism, 
                                                 
1 Alexander Dugin, Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed From the Right (United Kingdom: Arktos, 
2014), 29. 
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egalitarianism, and democracy. Along with Dugin’s calls for the formation of a greatly 
enlarged Russian, or Eurasian, empire, he has encouraged the formation of a new 
European empire, based on “Indo-European, Roman and Greek values.”2 Over the years 
his activities and collective body of thought have drawn the interest of various scholars of 
fascism, neo-fascism and the broader New Right movement. Given his known political 
and philosophical affiliations it has become a recent trend among historians and political 
scientists to claim that, like many of his ideological allies, Dugin harbors racist and 
fascistic sympathies or at least a sort of Russian supremacist worldview, despite his own 
arguments to the contrary. 
With the recent annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the fighting 
in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian military forces and Russian forces and their 
separatist allies, Neo-Eurasianism has become an increasingly visible ideology to 
international observers. Dugin himself has hailed the annexation of Crimea as an 
important but very small victory that will lead to the ousting of American hegemony and 
liberal values from “Crimea to Lisbon.” 3  An ideology that sanctions such rampant 
expansionism and violence has caught the attention of scholars as well. In the hopes of 
intellectually discrediting and disarming the violent, anti-liberal and eschatological nature 
of Neo-Eurasianism, it is important to place Dugin’s broad body of ideas within a 
categorization in order to better define what Dugin is and what he is not. The primary 
research question of this work, then, is how can we define Alexander Dugin’s 
worldview? More fundamentally, can Neo-Eurasianism be considered a form of fascism 
native to Russia? Furthermore, is Dugin’s Traditionalism and exhortation to preserve the 
cultural diversity of the world a façade created in order to cover up a fundamentally racist 
set of ideas? Additionally, how do his ideas differ from historical traditionalists like his 
personal inspiration, Julius Evola, as well as the broader intellectual currents present 
within the European and North American New Right? 
The major argument of this study is that, contrary to some scholars who argue that 
Dugin is a fascist and an ethnic Russian nationalist or even a racist, Dugin’s avowed 
perennial Traditionalist worldview is genuine and it precludes his thinking from the 
modernism present in fascist thought and aesthetics as well as any biological racism.  
                                                 
2 Dugin, Putin vs Putin, 309. 
3 Alexander Dugin, “Alexander Dugin: Horizons of Our Revolution from Crimea to Lisbon” Open Revolt 
<http://openrevolt.info/2014/03/07/alexander-dugin-crimea/>. 
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Rather, Dugin is a cultural and spiritual imperialist, one who maintains that nationhood is 
defined, not by race or ethnicity, but by the cultural and spiritual participation of a people 
in their Traditional faith. Narrating the history of the world and the Russian nation 
through a fall-redemption myth-symbol complex, he ultimately defines Russians, and 
other peoples, as physical manifestations of sacred or spiritual ideas. For the Russians, 
their historic and spiritual destiny is that of a unifier and protector of other particular and 
smaller peoples. Nonetheless, despite much of the rhetoric of Neo-Eurasianism, the 
Russian nation is the most indispensable nation in Dugin's supranational project. 
The Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin's Neo-Eurasianist movement, like the 
European New Right, have both been likened to fascist movements. For the purposes of 
this project, I will be utilizing Roger Griffin’s concept of the “fascist minimum” in order 
to ascertain the possibility of a genuine fascism in Neo-Eurasianism. Griffin maintains 
that in order for a movement to be considered truly fascist it must meet two fundamental 
criteria. Firstly, the movement must articulate a belief that the nation must return to a set 
of sacred values lost since the advent of modernity and be reborn anew. This palingenesis 
is manifested though an often secular alternative modernism that, while discarding 
modern values of liberalism, egalitarianism and individualism, nonetheless posits a faith 
in modernity’s technological progress, populism and secularism. The second requirement 
to meet for a movement or ideology to be considered fascist is a profound 
ultranationalism that views the betterment of one’s nation as the ultimate good. While it 
is not a necessary prerequisite to being defined as fascist, biological racism has been a 
facet of some of the most violent and abhorrent fascist regimes such as National Socialist 
Germany. Given that Dugin’s religious ideas have often been likened to the ideas 
espoused by noted anti-Semites such as Julius Evola and the Ariosophists, I will also 
examine Dugin’s understanding of race in order to ascertain whether or not we can 
classify Dugin as a racist. 
In a literature review, I will explain in detail the major rifts and gaps within the 
current scholarship on Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism and its relationship to fascism. In 
general there are two general interpretations among scholars as to Dugin’s avowed 
Traditionalism and worldview. Some academics such as Marlene Laruelle connect 
Dugin’s esoteric writings with the writings of noted Ariosophists such as Guido von List 
who portrayed Aryan man as a biologically supreme race. Other writers, like the 
theologian James Heiser, emphasize the eschatological nature of Dugin’s writings which 
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are in full agreement with Traditionalism. Still others, such as Andreas Umland maintain 
that despite his protestations, Dugin cannot be considered a Traditionalist as his ideas are 
largely aberrant from much of what can be considered Guénonian Traditionalism. Rather, 
Umland maintains, Dugin’s ideas can best be described as truly fascist. I argue that 
Heiser’s interpretation is closest to reality and that Dugin’s Traditionalist writings are not 
a cloak but are rather genuinely held sentiments, and are shorn of both the modernism 
and ultranationalism of fascism as well as biological racism. 
Given that this project is a multi-disciplinary endeavor I will be drawing from 
both social science and historical sources. In order to ascertain whether or not Dugin can 
be considered a fascist, I will be drawing generally from the literature on theories of 
fascism. 
In the Methodology section I will explain how I appraise the level of fascistic 
thought in Neo-Eurasianism. This will be accomplished through exploring not only 
Dugin’s own body of work, but also examining the work of Traditionalists such as René 
Guénon (1886 – 1951) and Julius Evola (1898 -1974), both of whom as Dugin notes have 
been particularly influential on his worldview. Thirdly, by examining contemporary racist 
thinkers in the New Right I hope to elucidate how Dugin has been seen as a problem to 
many racist New Rightists today, who have come to view Dugin as a multiculturalist 
subversive within right-wing politics. By examining all three broad bodies of literature I 
hope to explain how Dugin, while representing fundamentally violent and dangerous 
thought, nonetheless perceives the world very differently from what we can consider to 
be a fascist worldview. 
The first chapter of the work provides general background information about 
Alexander Dugin. Here I will discuss the basic tenets of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory 
and his anti-modernism. Furthermore, I will discuss his geopolitical goals for the creation 
of a Eurasian empire. 
The second chapter discusses the historic origins of the Eurasianist movement 
during the Russian Civil War. The early Eurasianists argued for a historiographical 
interpretation of Russian history as one that transcended East and West by idealizing 
Russia’s historical connections to the Mongolian Empire. Then, the chapter will describe 
in brief the Cold War era origins of the European New Right and its expansion into North 
America. Taken together, both of these broad movements represent the general non-
Traditional influences on Neo-Eurasianist thought and methods. 
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Thirdly, I will discuss the historical origins of Perennial Traditionalism and the 
ideas of René Guénon and Julius Evola. It is impossible to understand Dugin’s own 
worldview without understanding Traditionalism. Consequently, I will discuss 
Traditionalism’s vehement anti-modernism and Dugin’s continuation of that strain of 
thought. This violent anti-modernism will be shown to be fundamentally at odds to the 
alternative modernity proposed by most palingenetic fascisms. 
In the fourth section of the thesis, Dugin’s ideas concerning the importance of the 
Russian nation will be placed in the context of a broader, supranational Eurasian project. 
Dugin has proposed the unification of much of the Eurasian continent, led by Russia, into 
a greater Eurasian empire that will facilitate the end of American globalism and 
consumerism and their replacement with the re-enthronement of Traditional values. 
Although Russian nationalists and imperialists have historically utilized similar 
narratives that envision Russia as a uniter of disparate peoples in order to justify Russian 
expansion at the expense of smaller peoples, this section will emphasize that Dugin’s 
faith in the Perennial Tradition precludes him from this vulgar sense of national 
enrichment. Rather, Dugin genuinely envisions the Russian nation as an important, but 
only a part of, a greater whole in which Tradition, not the nation or race, is the highest 
value. Thus the fourth chapter acts as a negation of Griffin’s second prerequisite for a 
movement or ideology to be fascist: extreme ultranationalism. 
The fifth chapter of the thesis discusses the understanding of race and racism in 
both the Perennial Tradition and Alexander Dugin’s thought. Although not a prerequisite 
to meet the fascist minimum, a discussion of Dugin, Traditionalism and race will 
hopefully extirpate notions about Nazi influences over Neo-Eurasianism. It is 
conceivable that Alexander Dugin, given what he has written, has genuinely discounted 
race as meaningful in identity and has at most applied Evola’s ideas of a sort of “spiritual 
race.” As will be seen, Evola did not believe that race was a purely inherent biological 
trait. Rather, Evola conceived of race as a spiritual characteristic of individuals that could 
be elevated through station and virtuous living, regardless of ethnicity. Concomitantly, I 
will place Dugin into the context of a broader internal debate within the New Right, 
particularly among members of the North American New Right. This debate centers on 
how they should interpret Alexander Dugin’s own body of thought. While there has been 
no consensus reached, racist thinkers such as Greg Johnson and Michael O’Meara have 
been adamant that Dugin is a subversive element within the New Right movement and 
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his doctrine of multi-polarity and his anti-racism make him an enemy, not a friend, of 
White Nationalism and racist thought. Thus, the chapter demonstrates that Dugin cannot 
be considered a biological racist à la National Socialism. 
Ultimately, the novelty and uniqueness of this project derives from two major 
sources. By discussing Dugin’s relationship to historic fascist ideas I hope to participate 
in the vibrant discussions being held between various scholars on how we should 
interpret Dugin’s illiberal and violent ideas. I hope to emphasize, as few others have, just 
how fundamentally Traditionalism colors Dugin’s worldview more than anything else. In 
addition, the novelty of this thesis can be seen in viewing Secondly, by discussing the 
recent debates within the New Right on Dugin, we bring to bear circumstantial, but no 
less important, evidence that Dugin’s views, despite what some scholars might indicate, 
are fundamentally not racist. 
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Literature	Review	
 
Considering the massive body of literature produced by Dugin, scholars have 
attempted to synthesize his vision in order to fully understand just what his goals truly 
are. He has repeatedly and clearly stated that the United States’ global hegemony must be 
defeated and that Russia must expand to include much of Eurasia and form an alliance 
with a pro-Russian Europe. Yet his eclectic intellectual background drawn from the 
European New Right, interwar esoteric religion, Russian Orthodoxy, and his own 
mystical Russian messianism has drawn scholars to question just which factors most 
influence Dugin’s worldview, and whether or not he can be considered a fascist. Most 
scholars accept that Dugin’s worldview constitutes a Russo-centric totalitarian program 
that in the very least has been influenced by the German Conservative Revolutionary 
movement and a modicum of esoterica. However, a central point of debate dominates the 
discourse on Alexander Dugin and his philosophy. Specialists are divided on how to 
interpret Dugin’s nationalism. Some scholars such as Marlene Laruelle and Edith Clowes 
emphasize Dugin’s use of arcane themes such as sacred geography as a means of covertly 
espousing a racist or in the very least a fascistic worldview. Conversely, other scholars 
such as the theologian James Heiser maintain that Dugin’s esoteric language is a 
manifestation of his fundamentalist religious worldview. Concomitantly, scholars such as 
Anton Shekhovstov and Andreas Umland have declared that Dugin is fundamentally a 
fascist who merely utilizes the esoteric language of anti-modern Traditionalism as a way 
of covering up his more insidious worldview.  
This thesis is an attempt at contributing to the following debates by maintaining 
that, contrary to the ideas proposed by Umland and Shekhovtsov, Dugin’s Traditionalism 
is not a cover but is a genuine worldview that he holds. Thus, his antimodernism and 
supranational project are not manifestations of a philosophical expediency but a non-
fascist - yet no less dangerous - ideology. Furthermore In addition to an attempt at 
contributing to the ongoing debate on Dugin, this work will utilize a source of material 
that many scholars have not utilized – the writings of the current New Right on Dugin. 
While it is certainly not a monolithic movement, the New Right has produced a bevy of 
literature that can help shed light on Dugin and how he views biological race. 
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Dugin and Race 
 
One of the key debates centered on Dugin is how one can understand his approach 
to race. His ideas draw heavily on a fascistic cult of action and violence and his Russian 
expansionism coupled with conspiracy theories about a millennia-old war between the 
mercantile West and spiritual East has earned him the reputation among some scholars 
such as Marlene Laruelle as a racist ultranationalist. Laruelle admits that Dugin’s 
worldview a mixed one and he has espoused often seemingly contradictory ideas. 
Nonetheless she contends that Dugin’s worldview is in many ways colored by the 
concept of ethnicity and race. Laruelle argues that Dugin has been mainly influenced by 
the racist aspect of perennial Traditionalism through Julius Evola as well as the theory of 
ethnogenesis postulated by the revered Soviet scholar Lev Gumilev. She maintains that 
despite his rhetoric extolling the virtues of a multi-cultural world Dugin is nonetheless a 
fervent Russian nationalist who envisions a new Russian empire dominated by ethnic 
Russians.4 
The first aspect of Dugin’s racial identification of nation, according to Laruelle, is 
his links to Evolian Tradition and sacred geography. She emphasizes the strong 
correlation between the esoteric proto-and post-Nazi Ariosophy of Guido von List and 
Jorg von Liebensfels, and Dugin’s own esoteric language. The esoteric racist doctrine of 
the Ariosophists claimed a racial homeland in the north called Atlantis, Thule, or 
Hyperborea. This ancient homeland was the birthplace of the racially superior Aryan 
people who brought culture and civilization to the world starting on the Indian 
subcontinent. Dugin, according to Laruelle, creates a similar narrative. In his 1991 book, 
The Mysteries of Eurasia, Dugin claims that “the continents have a symbolic 
significance.”5 For Eurasia Dugin has discovered a northern homeland in Siberia – thus 
giving the Russians a Nordic identity, something that is essential in a Nazi-inspired 
discourse.6 By utilizing esoteric language, Laruelle argues, Dugin merely covers what is 
in reality a highly racist worldview that sees Russians as a fundamentally Nordic, and 
superior, people. 
Additionally, Laruelle highlights Dugin’s intellectual debt to the works of Lev 
                                                 
4 Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, trans. Mischa Gabowitsch (Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2012), 130. 
5 Quoted in Laruelle Russian Eurasianism, 130. 
6 Laruelle Russian Eurasianism, 130. 
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Gumilev, the celebrated Soviet ethnologist. 7  Gumilev’s theories, although very 
controversial in the West, remain a mainstay for many Russian scientists, who adhere to 
their pseudo-scientific examination of ethnicity. Gumilev posits a deterministic 
worldview that pits ethnicities against one another. Gumilev’s conception of ethnicity is 
based largely on a “science of history” that maintains that history can be predicted. 
Furthermore, Gumilev argued that ethnicities were formed over centuries through 
peoples’ interactions with the territory and soil that they inhabited. Ethnic mixing was 
strictly discouraged as the mixing of ethnicities would lead to the weakening of the 
biological stock of ethnic groups.8 Thus Laruelle maintains that despite Dugin’s use of 
esoteric and religious language, he defines the Russian nation fundamentally along ethnic 
or even racist lines. 
Similarly, Edith Clowes’ book Russia on the Edge – Imagined Geographies and 
Post-Soviet Identity is another example of scholarship that represents Dugin’s 
Traditionalist rhetoric as largely ephemeral.9 Clowes notes that Dugin’s flowery language 
of protecting national specificities is largely a cover for a greater Russian project that 
sees the fulfillment of Russian national interests as the only goal worth pursuing. By 
Clowes’ reckoning, in any neo-Eurasian project the smaller nations inevitably will be 
swallowed up by its supposed protector, making Dugin’s ideas nothing less than 
“political hypocrisy.”10 This political hypocrisy, according to Clowes, extends to religious 
hypocrisy. She condemns Dugin’s supposed universalism when it comes to generally 
favorable references to all world religions while simultaneously extolling the virtues of 
Russia for having Russian Orthodoxy as its official state religion. 
Andreas Umland, who is a specialist on the post-communist Russian far right, has 
written extensively on the Neo-Eurasian phenomenon. In 2007 he maintained that 
Dugin’s  worldview was fundamentally Traditionalist arguing, “being framed by the ideas 
of Evola and other Traditionaists, Dugin sees Orthodoxy as only one of several religions 
that have preserved the initial ‘tradition.”’11 However, Umland has recently questioned 
                                                 
7 Laruelle Russian Eurasianism, 116. 
8 Laruelle Russian Eurasianism, 69 
9 Edith Clowes, Russia on the Edge – Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2011), 44. 
10 Clowes, Russia on the Edge, 63. 
11 Andreas Umland, “Post-Soviet ‘Uncivil Society’ and the Rise of Alexandr Dugin – A Case Study in 
Extraparliamentary Radial Right in Contemporary Russia (Ph.D dissertation, Trinity College-Cambridge, 
2007), 150. 
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his own argument that Dugin’s worldview is fundamentally colored by his religious 
worldview. Now Andreas Umland along with Anton Shekhovtsov question the efficacy of 
calling Dugin a Traditionalist at all. In the article, “Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? 
Neo-Eurasianism and Perennial Philosophy,” Umland and Shekhovtsov counter Mark 
Sedgwick’s argument12 that Dugin represents a recent, albeit innovative, manifestation of 
René Guénon’s Traditionalist worldview. Umland and Shekhovtsov emphasize the 
influence of Evola rather than Guénon on Dugin’s politics. According to this argument 
Guénon’s Traditionalism was fundamentally based around changing one’s own spiritual 
life in order to transcend modern decadence while Evola’s was about changing society at 
large – often through violent means, thus neither Dugin or Evola represent Guénonian 
Tradition. 13  Shorn of the label of Traditionalist and its accompanying universalism, 
Dugin’s ideas appear increasingly secular and fascist. 
 
Dugin and Tradition 
 
Other scholars, however, hold that explaining Dugin’s nationalism within an 
ethnic or racist paradigm makes little sense. In his discussion on nationalism in post-
communist Russia, Wayne Allensworth argues that Dugin’s religious approach bars 
Dugin from thinking of the Russian nation along ethnic or racial lines. Allensworth 
suggests that Dugin is attempting to create a new Russian.14 Appropriating the position of 
the Russian nation’s chief storyteller, Dugin is creating a new narrative of Russian history 
and destiny that combines the Perennial Tradition with Russian messianism. He 
underlines the Russian nation’s divine mission to unite other cultures around a protective 
Russian empire. Thus, Allensworth interprets Dugin’s definition of nation along 
religious, albeit esoteric, lines. 
The theologian, James Heiser, has produced a recent monograph that examines 
Dugin’s eschatological thought. In “’The American Empire Should Be Destroyed”’ 
Aleksander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology” Heiser takes Dugin at 
                                                 
12 Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern orld: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the 
Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 225. 
13 Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovtsov, “Is Alexander Dugin a Traditionalist? ‘Neo-Eurasianism’ and 
the Perennial Philosophy” The Russian Review 68 (October 2008), 676. 
14 Wayne Allensworth, “Dugin and the Eurasian Controversy: Is Eurasianism ‘Patriotic?’” in Russian 
Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, ed. Marlene Laruelle (London: Routledge, 2010), 116. 
11 
 
 
his word that he is indeed a Traditionalist. Heiser likens Dugin’s metaphysical outlook as 
something akin to political religion and maintains that the links between Dugin’s 
Traditionalism and German racial theories are largely superficial. While Dugin makes use 
of the themes of an ancient pre-historical mythic landmass to the north that spawned a 
superior people, Heiser emphasizes that Dugin is largely talking about a spiritually 
superior people who held knowledge of the perenneial Tradition. Consequently, Heiser 
also maintains that Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism is not a racist ideology but fundamentally 
spiritual and religious. 
 
Dugin and Fascism 
 
Given that Neo-Eurasianism proposes an authoritarian and imperialist program 
that emphasizes a return to sacred values while disdaining liberalism and egalitarianism, 
it is unsurprising that many scholars have labeled Dugin a neo-fascist. Indeed, Dugin’s 
association with the ideas of sacred Geography present in Ariosophy and Julius Evola’s 
thought have allowed for scholars such as Laruelle to implicitly draw a line from 
National Socialist racism to Dugin. Similarly, scholars such as Anton Shekhovtsov have 
firmly maintained that Dugin is a fascist.15 Describing Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist imperial 
project as a “fascist Eurasian Union,” he then points to a picture of a meeting between the 
American anti-Semite and White Nationalist David Duke and Alexander Dugin as 
implicit proof that both Dugin and Duke share the same worldview. 16  Shekhovtsov 
rejects Dugin’s protestations against both fascism and racism as largely a cover for a 
fundamentally fascist ideology in a country and world where the language of fascism is 
barely acceptable. Andreas Umland, who as stated above has come to question Dugin’s 
adherence to Traditionalism, has increasingly spoken of Dugin as an outright fascist. 
Umland has warned against the increasingly “neo-fascist” intellectual currents present 
within Moscow State University’s sociology department. Arguing that Dugin, as head of 
the Center for Conservative Studies,  
 “has repeatedly acknowledged his closeness to the ideas of, among other 
                                                 
15 Anton Shekhovtsov, “Russian Fascist Aleksandr Dugin’s dreams of dictatorship in Russia” Anton 
Shekhovtsov’s Blog, 27 February, 2014. < http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/02/russian-fascist-
aleksandr-dugin-is.html>. 
16 Shekhovtosv, “Russian Fascist Aleksandr Dugin’s dreams of dictatorship in Russia” < http://anton-
shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/02/russian-fascist-aleksandr-dugin-is.html>. 
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fascist ideologies, Nazism, and uses the term "conservatism" as a cover for the 
spread of a revolutionary ultranationalist and neo-imperialist ideology. In recent 
years, he has built up a network of supporters in Moscow's higher echelons of 
power and established considerable foreign ties. If his behavior remains 
unchecked, Dugin could easily use the reputation of Moscow State University for 
further extension of his reach into Russian society.17” 
Thus for both Umland and Shekhovtsov, Neo-Eurasianism is a fundamentally fascist 
ideology based on its anti-liberal, anti-egalitarian, totalitarian and expansionist program. 
The debates discussed above represent the major points of conflict over how we 
are to interpret Dugin’s philosophical worldview. The present work supports a position 
close to James Heiser’s own understanding of Dugin. Fundamentally, Dugin envisions 
reality in genuinely religious and eschatological terms. Furthermore, it is accurate to 
describe Dugin as a Traditionalist. Despite Andreas Umland’s contention that Julius 
Evola represented a major break from Traditionalism, this study maintains that regardless 
of Evola’s difference in tactics from that of Guénon, they both shared fundamentally the 
exact same world view. For both Guénon and Evola the West was corrupt and dying, 
modernity and egalitarianism were great societal ills, and the West needed to return to 
Traditional forms of religious practice in order to save itself. Therefore, Dugin himself 
should be considered a Traditionalist. 
This study also argues that Edith Clowes’ interpretation of Dugin as a jingoist 
Russian nationalist, as well as Marlene Laruelle’s argument that Dugin’s worldview is 
heavily colored by Ariosophy and a racist worldview, are both not entirely correct. The 
present work will argue that despite his anti-liberalism and philosophical association with 
racial theorists, Dugin genuinely believes in what he says and that it is possible to 
participate in Evolian Traditionalism and not be a racist. Evola was indeed a racist. 
However, his racial theories were dominated by a belief in a “race of the spirit” as he saw 
biological racism as a symptom of decadent and modern scientific reductionism.  
The above debates showcase the major lines of discussion concerning Alexander 
Dugin and his ideas between scholars. While Neo-Eurasianism has only relatively 
recently become a topic of discussion amongst the scholarly community, it has 
                                                 
17 Andreas Umland, “Fascist Tendencies in Russian Higher Education: The Rise of Aleksandr Dugin and 
Moscow University’s Sociology Faculty” Opednews.com 24 August, 2011, 
<http://www.opednews.com/articles/Fascist-Tendencies-in-Russ-by-Andreas-Umland-110823-348.html>. 
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nonetheless produced several broad arguments about Dugin and his philosophy 
concerning his links to racist thought, fascism and Perennial Traditionalim. The next 
section will discuss the broader literature on fascism and how scholars have come to 
define fascism. It will detail some of the expansive definitions proposed by scholars in 
the past decades. Secondly, the next section proposes that Roger Griffin’s criteria of a 
“fascist minimum” is the most useful in analyzing a potential fascist organization and 
thus can be used to examine Alexander Dugin’s works in order to ascertain the level of 
fascistic content in his ideas. 
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Theoretical	Framework	
Taxonomies of Fascism 
 
Fascism has long been a highly contested term that has been the subject of much 
scholarly debate. Fascism is a disputed topic because unlike communism or liberalism, 
which has had time to develop intellectual and theoretical backdrops to their respective 
broad ideologies, fascism as a form of government existed in practice for a very short 
period of time during the interwar years. Indeed, some would go so far as to say that 
fascism, unlike liberalism or communism, inherently lacked any major essential 
intellectual foundations as it was a fundamentally emotive and reactive political 
movement that emphasized action over philosophy. Furthermore, many fascist 
experiments throughout the history of the broad movement exhibited different tendencies. 
For instance, Nazi Germany exhibited an extreme biological racism and anti-Semitism 
while Fascist Italy largely viewed race, or la Razza, as a cultural rather than biological 
phenomenon and only belatedly and in slavish emulation of Nazi Germany enacted anti-
Semitic laws.18  Similarly, Nazi Germany was perhaps the most “perfected” form of 
fascism in which traditional elites were almost completely deposed and Nazism 
permeated almost all of German daily life. Conversely, Fascist Italy was only partially 
successful in implementing a fascist program. Mussolini had to contend not only with a 
sometimes recalcitrant Catholic Church but even with the persistence of the Italian 
monarchy until Mussolini’s dismissal from office. 
According to the historian Robert O. Paxton, fascism, unlike communism in 
which internationalism is more or less a facet of its foundational philosophy, emphasizes 
a nation’s “cultural particularism” which precludes it from a simple taxonomy.19 Some 
scholars, such as Zeev Sternhell, have essentially given up on using the term “fascism” 
outside of the context of Mussolini’s Italy.20 For instance Sternhell contends that the 
centrality of biological racism in National Socialism and the lack of it in Italian Fascism 
precludes them from being classified as representatives of a generic fascism.21 Rather, 
would-be fascisms such as Romania’s Iron Guard movement and the Spanish Falangists 
                                                 
18 Robert O Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), Ebook. 
19 Paxton, Anatomy, Ebook. 
20 Zeev Sternhell trans. David Maisel The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion To Political 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994), 5. 
21 Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology, 5. 
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should be understood as unique phenomena unto themselves. On the other hand, other 
scholars including Roger Griffin, Stanley G. Payne and Robert O. Paxton hold that the 
problem of a generic fascist definition is not an insurmountable one. They have attempted 
to establish a “fascist minimum,” a set of criteria that, if met by the investigated political 
group, would allow scholars to identify them as a genuinely fascist movement. Griffin 
has argued that a subject ideology meets the fascist minimum if it “…is a political 
ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist 
ultra-nationalism.” 22  In other words, an ideology can be considered fascist when it 
combines a profound belief in the national need for a restoration of sacred values in order 
to be born anew with an extreme, often messianic and expansionist, nationalism. For the 
purposes of this study Griffin’s “fascist minimum” will be the means of measuring Neo-
Eurasianism’s fascist potential. However, prior to discussing Alexander Dugin’s possible 
fascism it is essential to discuss more in depth the historiographical and scholarly debate 
surrounding fascism in order to place Dugin’s body of thought within the broader context 
of the debate. 
Marxist thought has contributed significantly to the debate over fascism. It is no 
surprise that Marxist ideologues and scholars both have proposed an understanding of 
fascism that emphasizes class warfare. Marxist historians such as Dave Renton have 
repeatedly criticized other historians for their lack of emphasis of fascism’s 
fundamentally capitalist and anti-labor character.23 Marxist historiography argues that 
fascist experiments such as in Italy and Germany were in large part a violent reaction of 
capitalism against the proletariat in order to preempt an increasingly possible communist 
revolution.24 This is not to say that fascist movements were necessarily created by the 
ruling capitalists. Yet, Marxists maintain, fascism cannot come into power or remain in it 
without the support and funding of capitalists and big businesses. Once in power, fascist 
movements largely act to the benefit of industrialists or business owners by implementing 
reactionary laws aimed at restoring hierarchy, curtailing the ability of workers to 
organize, and violently suppressing all those who oppose them. 25  
In a similar vein, the historian Ernst Nolte, although not a Marxist, nonetheless came to 
                                                 
22 Roger Griffin, The Palingenetic Core of Fascist Ideology, 
<https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/ideologies/docs/the-palingenetic-core-of-generic-fascist-
ideology/index.html>. 
23 Dave Renton, Fascism: Theory and Practice (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 12. 
24 Renton, Fascism, 30. 
25 The Encyclopedia of Marxism <https://www.marxists.org/encyclopedia/terms/f/a.htm#fascism>. 
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the a parallel conclusion to that of Marxists by arguing that Fascism represented not so 
much a collection of positive ideas but a collection of negations the first two being anti-
Marxism and anti-materialism.26 According to Nolte, the Jews represented to Hitler and 
the Nazis a physical manifestation of a “spirit of modernity” whose values including 
Marxism, consumerism, and rationalism led to total cultural decadence and ennui.27 Thus 
the Holocaust enacted by the Nazis represented a penultimate war against modernity and 
its values. 
While the Marxist approach to fascism allows us to view fascism as a continuation of 
long-standing class struggle, it works to overly simplify fascism and reduce it to a single 
meaning. The weakness present within a Marxist understanding of fascism is its 
simplification of fascism into a purely class struggle. It is certainly true that capitalists, 
particularly industrialists, might have been favorably disposed towards fascists who 
promised militarization and war and thus profits for many of those who manufactured 
goods. Yet Marxist historiography cannot account for the sheer popularity of many fascist 
movements. Nazism, while certainly popular with many industrialists, also drew its 
support from broad swathes of the population including not only the middle class but also 
plenty of workers, farmers and unskilled laborers. By reducing fascism to a purely 
economic understanding, Marxist historiography fails to account for the millions of lower 
class men and women who favored fascism for different reasons.  
Another school of thought concerning the origins of fascism is called the “Weberian 
approach.28” While Marxists hold that capitalism was the essential force behind the rise 
of fascism, Weberian scholars argue that conservative aristocrats, landowners and 
traditional military elites facilitated the origins of fascism. They maintain that because 
countries like Germany, Spain, Italy and even Japan never experienced a genuine liberal-
democratic revolution, traditional elites played a very large role in their societies 
compared to, for example, Great Britain.29 Pre-industrial elites combined with the petty 
bourgeois and peasantry, all of whom felt threatened by urbanization and modernization, 
sought to repel secularism and socialism. Thus through mass conscription, entry into the 
Great War, and later through the fostering of fascist movements, many elites sought to 
                                                 
26 Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 20-21. 
27 Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism 31. 
28 Kevin Passmore, Fascism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 9. 
29 Passmore, Fascism, 10. 
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crush their domestic enemies in a wave of patriotic zealotry.30 Weberian scholars, then, 
view fascism as a fundamentally reactionary movement that sought to replace modern 
values and life with an idealized past. 
The problem with a Weberian account of the origins of fascism, however, is two-fold. 
Firstly, it places far too much faith in the ability of elites to manipulate the vast majority 
of the population when an increasing number of the population were literate, had access 
to at least rudimentary education and at least had some access to contemporary 
parliamentary politics. Similarly, while fascism can be understood in part as an anti-
modern phenomenon it is also true that fascism cannot exist outside of modernity. 
Indeed, fascism, while often utilizing a language that idealized a distant mythic past, 
nonetheless more often than not displaced traditional elites and values for new, secular 
and modern ones that emphasized a new, not traditional, hierarchy. 
While Marxists and other scholars have seen a continuation of class warfare or 
violent anti-modernism in the origins of historic fascism, others have sought to define 
what constitutes a fascist movement. The historian Emilio Gentile argues that a fascist 
movement is constituted by a broader appeal to not only anti-Marxism but also anti-
capitalism and anti-modernism and its supporters have historically come from throughout 
the economic spectrum. The following lists Gentile’s abridged understanding of what a 
fascist movement is: 
1. A multiclass mass movement that emphasizes national regeneration and 
militarism; 
2. an 'anti-ideological' and pragmatic ideology that is anti-materialist, anti-
individualist, antil-iberal, anti-democratic, and anti-Marxist that utilizes mystical 
myths and symbols; 
3. a culture founded on mystical thought and will to power; 
4. a totalitarian conception of the primacy of politics; 
5. a civil ethic founded on total dedication to the national community, on discipline, 
virility, comradeship, and the warrior spirit; 
6. a single state party; 
                                                 
30 Passmore, Fascism, 10. 
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7. a police apparatus that prevents, controls, and represses dissidence and 
opposition, even by using organized terror; 
8. A cult of the leader; 
9. corporative organization of the economy that suppresses trade union liberty; 
10. a foreign policy inspired by the myth of national power and greatness, with the 
goal of imperialist expansion.31 
 
Thus Gentile outlines an understanding of fascism as a multi-faceted ideology that is 
typified not just by a collection of shared negative values. For Gentile, fascism is also a 
series of positive values including not only extreme nationalism and a vision of national 
rejuvenation but also a devotion to authoritarian or totalitarian hierarchy, the primacy of 
politics over economics and the collective over the individual, as well as a cult of 
violence and militarism.   Gentile’s understanding of what constitutes a typical 
fascist state or ideology is one that can generally be accepted by most scholars. However, 
a critical point of conflict in our understanding of fascism is its stance on modernity. Just 
as fascists have historically compromised with conservative elites, if sometimes only 
temporarily, so too have fascists “compromised” with modernity. An abridged version 
ofStanley G. Payne’s outline of a definition of fascism emphasizes the paradoxically 
modern and anti-modern nature of fascist ideologies: 
1. Ideology and Goals: 
 Espousal of an idealist, vitalist, secular and voluntaristic philosophy,  
 Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional 
principles or models 
 Organization of a new highly regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic 
structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national 
syndicalist 
 Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use violence and war 
                                                 
31 Quoted in Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995), 5-6. 
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 The goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in the nation's relationship 
with other powers 
2. The Fascist Negations: 
 Anti-liberalism, anti-communism, anti-conservatism 
3. Style and Organization: 
 Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and 
style and with the goal of a mass single party militia 
 Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy, 
stressing emotional and mystical aspects.32 
 
Payne argues that fascism, while rejecting many modern values such as materialism, 
rationalism, the primacy of economics in understanding human relations, and human 
rights, nonetheless demonstrates its own modern nature through secularization, the 
displacement of traditional elites, populism, and the further bureaucratization of the state. 
Indeed, other scholars have pointed out the modern nature of fascism in not only its 
administrative actions but also in its aesthetics and worldview. While despairing of 
contemporary bourgeois values, fascists rarely took inspiration from idealized values 
within the past. Rather, fascists often attempted to create a new, modern value system that 
highlighted the powerful and violent capabilities of modern technology and the efficiency 
of industry.33 For instance, in Italy Tommaso Emilio Marinetti an early supporter of 
Fascism, called for a rejection of what he saw of bourgeois decadence and prudery. In its 
place, Marinetti envisioned a new, palingenetic society in which technology facilitated 
the growth a militant and zealous cult of the nation.34 Akin to Marinetti, Ernst Jünger 
called for the creation of a modern “warrior-worker.”35 This new class of man would 
zealously work toward an advanced industrial society which would be totally mobilized 
towards the needs of the nation and willing to fight at a moment’s notice. 
In summation, we can understand a movement or ideology to be fascist at the bare 
minimum when a palingenetic ideology of national rebirth meets ultranationalism. We 
                                                 
32 Payne, A History of Fascism, 7. 
33 Jobst Welge ed. Astradur Eysteinsson and Vivian Liska  "Fascist Modernism" Modernism, Vol. 2. 
(Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2007), 550. 
34 Welge, “Fascist Modernism,” 550. 
35 Welge, “Fascist Modernism,” 553. 
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can also distill other scholars’ interpretations of fascism to generalize that typical forms 
of fascism have often displayed a zealous militarism, expansionism, populism, 
authoritarianism and modernism while maintaining a hostility towards liberalism, 
Marxism, rationalism, and bourgeois values. At the same time however, fascism, while 
calling for a rebirth of the nation, often envisions a completely new nation rather than a 
restored idealized past. Thus fascist ideologies tend to emphasize a new modern aesthetic 
of technology, efficiency, apocalyptic violence and a new hierarchy that is ultimately 
largely disdainful of tradition. 
Robert Paxton has raised the important point that fascist ideological programs, 
insofar as they had ones, prior to coming to power did not always coincide with their 
policies once they did come to power. 36  It would be, for example, a problematic 
methodology to attempt to understand Nazism largely through reading the early Nazi 
speeches, particularly of the Strasser brothers.37 Yet Dugin is not in power, nor does 
Vladimir Putin openly support Dugin’s worldview. Thus in ascertaining whether or not 
Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism meets a fascist minimum his body of written ideas are largely 
the only sources on which to draw from.  
The following section of the thesis will outline the sources that have been utilized 
in order to analyze Neo-Eurasianism. Drawing from the scholarship of both historians 
and political scientists, it is possible to discern the major debates surrounding Dugin and 
his movement. Significantly, the thesis also draws on the writings of contemporary New 
Rightists whose view of Dugin have become increasingly hostile as of late. In addition, 
the section will explain why Roger Griffin’s concept of the “fascist minimum” will be 
utilized as a tool in order to properly taxonomize Neo-Eurasianism. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
36 Paxton, Anatomy, Ebook. 
37 Gregor and Otto Strasser were early members of the NSDAP who functioned as the leaders of the left 
wing of the party. They underscored a virulent anti-capitalism and socialist program that simply did not 
ultimately represent Nazism in practice. Rather, both brothers and their followers represented a threat to 
Hitler’s control over the party and Otto was expelled from the party in 1930 while Gregor was killed in 
1934 during the Night of the Long Knives. 
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Methodology	and	Sources	
 
This work was completed for an interdisciplinary purpose. Accordingly it relies on 
a broad collection of scholarship, both in history and social science. In order to establish 
a taxonomic understanding of Dugin’s thought, this study has drawn from a large pool of 
secondary references and analytical sources on the various theories of national identity, 
nationalism, and fascism. Furthermore, in order to engage in the current scholarly debate 
over Alexander Dugin’s fundamental worldview, I also draw on secondary sources that 
deal with Neo-Eurasianism and its intellectual and ideological ancestors. 
This work is largely an intellectual examination of a thinker’s body of thought. In 
order to ascertain the major components of Neo-Eurasianism and whether or not it can be 
considered a fascist ideology, it is important to examine much of Alexander Dugin’s 
writings. Thus, in order to measure fascism within Alexander Dugin’s proposed 
worldview this work relies on the utilization of Roger Griffin’s concept of the fascist 
minimum. Griffin’s two-pronged approach to defining a movement as fascist is 
considered by this author to be the best instrument in appraising an extreme right wing 
movement’s fascist tendencies. This is due to the fascist minimum’s simultaneous 
flexibility and rigidity. While scholars such as Payne and Gentile have laid out a truly 
helpful list of methods and ideas that are typically held to be fascist, they do not 
explicitly articulate what facets of their taxonomy, if any, constitute the most important in 
making a movement fascist. Conversely, Griffin’s understanding of fascism explicates 
two broad yet essential factors in making a ideology fascist – a palingenetic worldview 
combined with ultranationalism. 
In establishing the level of palingenetic mythology in Dugin’s worldview, this 
project will investigate in detail Dugin’s intellectual lineage. Thus a discussion of early 
Eurasianism, the European New Right, and most importantly Perennial Traditionalism 
must be laid out in order to contextualize Dugin’s ideas so that they are not presented in a 
vacuum. Concomitantly, Dugin’s writings on the ultimate regression of man from a 
divinely-ordained natural order of society, as Traditionalism espouses, will further 
explicate Dugin’s yearning for a return to a mythic past. However, while fascists have 
utilized a similar palingenetic mythology in the past, they have always simultaneously 
emphasized an alternative modernity emphasizing technological progress, secularism and 
populism. Dugin, it will be shown, is a determined cultural reactionary who at times even 
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shuns technology and is vehemently opposed to any form of mass politics. Thus Dugin 
will be portrayed as a fundamentally anti-modern reactionary. 
In ascertaining the level of ultranationalism in Dugin’s body of thought two 
methods will be used. Firstly, by Dugin’s stated imperial goals will be discussed in depth. 
Similar to many fascist movements, Dugin calls for the territorial expansion of his 
country. Dugin’s understanding of what it means to be Russian will be placed in context 
of Traditionalism which includes a belief in the sacral nature of territory and geography 
and the different spiritual natures of various peoples based in part on where they live. In 
the same vein, Julius Evola’s and Dugin’s writings on race and racism will be explored in 
order to understand how Traditionalism understands race in order to explicate that for 
Dugin, a mystical and divine truth, encapsulated in a supranational project is the highest 
good compared to fascism whose ultranationalism allows only for a secular 
understanding of a single nation’s well-being as the highest good. The level of 
ultranationalism present in Dugin’s body of thought can be measured and assessed, if 
only circumstantially, through the criticism and reproaches aimed at him by members of 
the openly racist New Right or White Nationalists. Adherents of the New Right who have 
expressed openly racist ideas question Dugin’s right to be among them. By examining 
their philosophical grievances with Dugin’s claims on race this study can shed light on 
what truly shapes Dugin’s worldview. 
The primary sources drawn on for this study include much of Dugin’s own work. 
This comprises Dugin’s attempts at theorizing what he calls the “Fourth Political 
Theory,” his work on geopolitics as well as his more esoteric and mystical reflections. 
Other primary sources include the writings of Traditionalists such as Julius Evola and 
New Rightists in the aim of placing Dugin accurately within the context of extreme right-
wing thought. 
Based on the above mentioned research methods and materials, this study 
attempts to answer the following questions: Is Neo-Eurasianism an example of a new 
fascist ideology? Does race or biology play a role in Dugin’s plans for a supranational 
Eurasian empire? How are Dugin’s ideas and arguments received by the broader New 
Right community? Ultimately, this work wishes to explain that Alexander Dugin 
professes a worldview that is profoundly anti-modern, anti-liberal and anti-American. 
Neo-Eurasianism is a dangerous ideology to world peace. Yet it is not a worldview that 
can be considered explicitly fascist. Nor, at the same time does Dugin’s thought 
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demonstrably have a place for race or biology as a meaningful factor in the historical 
development of national identities, despite the accusations that scholars have levelled at 
Dugin’s ideas in the past. 
The Theoretical Framework section of this thesis has outlined and detailed the 
major points of debate on fascist historical fascist movements and how one can define 
them. This thesis will utilize Roger Griffin’s two point criteria in order to ascertain 
whether or not Dugin’s ideas and actions articulate a fundamentally fascist worldview. 
The first chapter of this thesis briefly discusses the political life of Alexander Dugin and 
his general political worldview. In it, Dugin’s early attempts at infiltrating and 
influencing dissident post-Soviet groups will be discussed as well as his profoundly anti-
liberal philosophy and his geopolitical plans for a new Russian imperialism. 
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Chapter	1:	Alexander	Dugin’s	Political	Life	and	Ideology	
 
 
  In February, 2014 Kiev, the capital city of Ukraine, was rocked by a series of 
increasingly violent clashes between protesters and government forces. The source of the 
conflict was over the refusal of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to sign a trade 
agreement with the European Union that would see Ukraine tied closer economically to 
Europe and decrease Russian economic influence in Ukraine. Instead, in December 2013 
Yanukovych elected to sign a trade agreement with Russia, which included cheap natural 
gas from the Russian Federation to Ukraine in exchange for providing the Russian navy 
with warm water ports along the Kerch peninsula.38 Almost immediately pro-western 
Kievans began a series of protests against their government's decision. The protests, 
initially peaceful, quickly became violent as police forces sought to quell the unrest. With 
no end in sight to the rising tensions and violence, Yanukovych fled the country and a 
new interim government took control of the Ukrainian state. With the fall of the pro-
Russian Ukrainian government and with the support of Putin's Russia, ethnically Russian 
areas of Ukraine, notably the Crimean peninsula and eastern parts of the country began 
violently agitating for independence. As we speak, there continues to be something akin 
to a civil war developing within Ukraine. The Crimean peninsula has been successfully 
annexed into the Russian Federation and areas with many ethnic Russians have been 
equipped and sometimes supported by Russian troops. 
Despite President Vladimir Putin's repeated declarations that the Russian 
Federation does not desire to get involved in a foreign country's internal affairs, it is an 
open secret that Russian troops have armed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions that have seized parts of Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Russian ultranationalists such 
as Vladimir Zhirinovsky have openly called for even further encroachments upon 
Ukrainian sovereignty. Indeed, Zhirninovsky has gone so far as to threaten the 
“destruction” of Poland and the Baltic states if the United States and the rest of the West 
retaliated against Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.39 Like Zhirinovsky, many nationalists 
view Ukraine, or at least significant parts of its territory, as part of Russia's legitimate 
                                                 
38Oksana Bashuk Hepburn. “Putin's Meddling in Ukraine Sinister.” Winnipeg Free Press, February 22, 
2014. 
39Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Zhirinovsky Threatens to 'Wipe Out' Poland, Baltics.” The 
Interpreter August 4, <http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-roots-of-pro-russian-
separatists-in-russianultranationalistgroups/>. 
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territory. The foundation of a Ukrainian state in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet 
Union constituted a defeat for the Russian nation and a victory for the West, an eternal 
enemy in much of Russian nationalist discourse. Ukraine's loss is just one of many 
injustices that contemporary Russian rightists such as Alexander Dugin hope to redress in 
their lifetimes – a hope that they have placed in the person of Vladimir Putin. 
Dugin has participated in Russian politics in one capacity or another since before 
the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. In 1998 Dugin participated in the Pamyat 
organization, hoping to bring to it his more esoteric explanation of Russian history. 
However, Pamyat’s reactionary monarchism and unbridled anti-Semitism reportedly 
drove Dugin away. After the split, Dugin founded several institutions such as the 
publishing house Arctogaia Association and became an unofficial advisor to Gennady 
Zyuganov, the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Next 
Dugin attempted to form his own political party. Working with Eduard Limonov he 
formed the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) which utilized a radical synthesis of both 
Stalinist and National Socialist symbolism and rhetoric. 40  Directly inspiring 
Zhirinovsky’s 1994 autobiography The Last Drive to the South, Dugin has called for a 
new Russian empire to expand into the former Soviet Union, northern China, Central 
Asia and also Eastern Europe. More recently, Alexander Dugin has also created a 
political party known as the Eurasia Party and the Eurasia Youth Movement. The former, 
although recognized by the Ministry of Justice of Russia in 2002, has been largely 
inactive. Conversely, the youth movement has participated in various notorious 
antisiocial activities such as the 2007 trashing of a Holodmar, or the Ukrainian famine 
that many Ukrainians believe to have been orchestrated under Stalin in 1932-33, 
exhibition in Moscow.41 Since the outbreak of War in Ukraine, Ukrainian chapters of the 
Eurasia Youth Movement have been banned and Dugin himself has been not allowed to 
enter Ukraine. Until late 2014 Dugin has had a presence in Russian academia as a 
professor of sociology at Moscow State University and is the Director of the Center for 
Conservative Studies at MSU. Dugin’s position as a faculty member at MSU has recently 
                                                 
40 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind 
Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2014 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain>. 
41 “After Goverla ‘Eurasians’ Defeated the Holodmar Exhibition” Ukrainian Truth, November 17, 2007 < 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2007/11/17/3320397/>. 
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been pulled due to his vocal support for the mass murder of anti-Russian Ukrainians.42 
Furthermore Dugin is a television personality, having participated in political discussions 
on Russian as well as foreign programs, including one broadcast from Iran. A prolific 
writer, he has served as advisor to the State Duma and his Foundations of Geopolitics has 
been on the required reading lists of Russian military officer schools. His work has been 
rumored to have had the ear of Putin himself from time to time.43 
In his 2001 manifesto of the Eurasianist Movement, Dugin decried a fallen world 
in which totalitarian uniformity and consumerism are the only hallmarks of the modern 
life.44 Additionally angered by the seeming political and ideological apathy of the masses, 
he wrote, “The majority of political parties and formalized social movements pursue 
tactical purposes. Practically nowhere can be found an explicit and consequent ideology 
capable to snatch man from a state of sleepy indifference, to make life worth living.”45 
For Dugin, this philosophical ennui has been largely fostered by the victory of American 
liberal democracy and Americanization of the cultures of the world, which he describes 
as an “Atlanticist tsunami.”46 In addition to what he sees as the death of ideology, Dugin 
also mourns the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which he regards an unmitigated 
disaster. According to Dugin, the end of the Soviet Union meant the effective end of 
organized opposition to globalization and Americanization. However, rather than a 
restoration of the Soviet Union Dugin proposes a new political union, a Eurasian one. A 
Eurasianist empire would stretch into territories and countries that neither the Russian 
Empire nor the Soviet Union had ever ruled over. The Eurasianist movement represents a 
supranational project that will unite many different religions and ethnic groups into a 
single empire. On the surface, Dugin’s geopolitical vision appears to be driven by a 
desire for the maximization of Russian power and influence. To some extent, that is 
correct. However, pregnant within Dugin’s territorial ambitions for a Eurasianist empire 
                                                 
42 James Heiser, “Invasion of Ukraine Continues; Russian Ideologue Calls for ‘Genocide,’” The New 
American September 4, 2014 <http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/europe/item/19042-invasion-
of-ukraine-continues-russian-ideologist-calls-for-genocide>. 
43 Barbashin and Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain.”  
44 Alexander Dugin, Eurasia Above All: Manifest of the Eurasist Movement, 
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/Manifesto.html>. 
45 Alexander Dugin, Eurasia Above All: Manifest of the Eurasist Movement,  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/Manifesto.html>. 
 
46 Alexander Dugin, Eurasia Above All: Manifest of the Eurasist Movement,  
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are Traditional ideas of sacred space as well as a new ideological model of identity. The 
model incorporates ideas of both civilization and the spiritual missions of peoples as 
constitutive facets of identity. The Eurasianist project ultimately posits a new 
understanding of Russians by portraying Russia as an important “glue” to a greater 
Eurasian empire, thus fulfilling its divinely-ordained mission – to be a uniter of peoples. 
In Dugin’s popular work, The Fourth Political Theory, he proposes that in order 
to counter the deculturating effects of modernity and globalization, a new ideology must 
be created. He argues that the modern world has seen the advent of three major 
ideologies; liberalism, communism, and fascism. 47  Of the three, only liberalism has 
survived the wars that the competing systems had spawned. He then posits that of the 
three major ideologies, each one had a primary agent that effectively “moved” history 
and that all three believed in mono-linear time that was deterministic and utopian.48 In 
the case of liberalism, the major historical actor was the individual. Dugins’s views on 
liberalism are similar to those proposed by the Nouvelle Droite. The history of the 
individual was one of progress and liberation in which the individual is “liberated from 
all things external to oneself.”49 This leads to the individual’s renunciation of his God and 
spiritual upbringing, then his community, his family, and even his gender. In the ideology 
of liberalism, Dugin fears, lies self-destruction. In the same vein, communism also 
espoused a belief in the inevitable progress of man. However, communism’s major 
historical subject was not the individual but class. According to communist discourse 
class conflict determined human history and it was a scientific reality that eventually a 
worldwide proletarian revolution would occur and create a utopian, classless society. 
However, Dugin views communism as a horrible alternative to liberalism because it 
shares its materialism, scientific determinism, and atheistic spirit.50 The third ideology, 
fascism, exemplified by the statism of Fascist Italy and the unfettered biological racism 
of National Socialism, apparently disgusts Dugin. Dugin rails against racism and the 
“criminal practice of wiping out entire ethnic groups…” and blames it as the sole cause 
of the Second World War. 51  Simultaneously he decries the guilt by association 
experienced by Conservative Revolutionaries and the vilification of their ideas as a form 
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of “racism.”52 Indeed, liberalism, concomitant with a culture of political correctness and 
an incontrovertible faith in its universalizing mission, represents another form of 
“racism” for Dugin. 
According to Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, he rejects both communism and 
fascism as inadequate models to combat what he sees as the sinister destructiveness of 
liberalism. Instead, Dugin proposes a new historical “subject:” civilization. Advancing 
the concept of civilization as a historical actor in the modern world, Dugin has effectively 
created a vehicle and intellectual justification for his Eurasianist project. Admitting that 
the definition of civilization is highly contested, he posits a challenge to Samuel P. 
Huntington’s register of civilizations. In his influential work The Clash of Civilizations, 
Huntington argued that there was a Western civilization embodying North America, 
Canada, Australia and much of Europe, as well as Latin American, African, Islamic, 
Japanese, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist and Orthodox civilizations.53 Dugin asserts that Canada 
and the United States, along with the United Kingdom, are not part of Western 
civilization but rather an Atlanticist current within Western civilization along with the 
United Kingdom.54 Indeed, Europe is divided between a fundamentally Atlanticist and 
Continental Europe, the latter wishing closer ties with Russia as well as the loosening of 
ties with the United States and globalization in general. Similarly, Dugin rejects 
Huntington’s appraisal of Orthodox civilization, containing much of the Balkans and the 
former Soviet Union. Rather, Dugin maintains that Orthodox civilization should be 
understood as a part of a greater Eurasian civilization, including Mongols, Turks, 
Caucasians, and “a significant proportion of the population professing Islam,” all with 
shared histories with Russia.55 In his attempt at devising a political theory to be used to 
counter globalization, Dugin argues for a civilizational model that sees a much 
strengthened Russia. 
One of the most important works written by Alexander Dugin is Osnovi 
Geopolitiki, or The Foundations of Geopolitics. It is a work that articulates in detail 
Dugin’s territorial basis for the dismantlement of what he sees as American global 
domination and the rise of a great Eurasian empire united by the Russian nation. In order 
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to bring down American global hegemony Dugin proposes a massive alliance that will 
utilize the resources and manpower of Asia and Europe. Simultaneously, Dugin calls for 
the support of any American separatist movements, including “Afro-American racists,” in 
order to destabilize and weaken the United States.56 Additionally, Dugin maintains that 
only an extreme redrawing of the world map will ensure the fulfillment of Russia’s 
spiritual mission and a return to a multi-polar world. 
Dugin proposes the formation of several alliance systems between Russia and 
other partners to ensure the success of the Eurasianist project. Firstly, a Moscow-Berlin 
axis should be formed. To realize it, Russia would return East Prussia back to Germany 
which, along with France, would also dominate much of Scandinavia and central and 
southern Europe.57 In addition, a similar Moscow-Tokyo alliance, along with India and 
Vietnam, will ensure the dismemberment of China’s borderlands, as Dugin considers 
China to be an enemy to any Eurasianist mission. In compensation, China would receive 
de facto hegemony over Southeast Asia excluding Vietnam as well as the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Australia. Japan would receive the Kurile Islands back from Russia and be 
allowed to pursue an imperial policy not unlike that of Imperial Japan during the Second 
World War.58 The Pacific islands, and presumably Hawaii too, would fall under Japanese 
control. The final major alliance proposed by Dugin is one with Islamic Iran which he 
considers a natural ally of Russia against American cultural imperialism and thus willing 
to provide naval bases for the Russian navy, allowing it access to the Indian Ocean.59 
Turkey would also be severely weakened with the secession of a Kurdish state but 
ultimately gain its own hegemony over much of the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Iraq, and 
Syria. Ultimately, the borders of a Eurasian-Russian empire would include not only 
almost all of the former Soviet Union, but also Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, almost all of 
the Caucusus, Finland, Poland, and almost all of the Balkans.60 
Russian imperialists have historically utilized a missionary and evangelical 
message to justify expansionism. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
Russian Empire often maintained that the spread of Russian influence throughout Central 
and East Asia was necessary to bring the light of Orthodoxy and the just rule of the Tsars 
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to the native peoples. When dealing with the Balkan Slavs or the Ottoman Empire the 
official narrative espoused by Russian authorities was that Russia needed to protect 
Slavic and Orthodox minorities from the persecutions of non-Orthodox rulers. Similarly, 
the creation of the Soviet Union led to a change in the justificatory language of Russian 
expansion, but not its fundamental mission to expand state power. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia has argued for the protection of ethnic Russians in the 
“near-abroad.” In the name of protecting ethnic Russians, the Russian Federation has 
violently attempted to dismember its neighbors as can be seen in the 2008 war with 
Georgia and the more recent annexation of Crimea and the support of pro-Russian 
separatists in eastern Ukraine. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
constriction of Russia’s borders have meant that pursuing an ethnic justification of 
expansion is problematic for greater imperial goals. This is because most of the ethnic 
Russians requiring “protection” are along the borders of Russia and within former Soviet 
Union republics. Thus, any plans to successfully extend Russia’s current borders into 
former Soviet republics would more than likely require force and a convincing 
ideological motive. Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism represents a potentially very 
useful ideological tool to articulate what he sees as a necessary expansion of Russian 
territory. 
This chapter has briefly discussed some of the highlights of Dugin’s political life. 
From his attempts at influencing the ideas of patriotic groups such as Pamyat and his 
attempts at creating political parties such as the National Bolshevik Party and the more 
recent Eurasia Party, Dugin has consistently been a voice for the dissident far right for the 
past two decades. Yet Dugin’s philosophical and geopolitical worldview was not created 
in a vacuum. Indeed, his conception of a Russia that transcends both East and West and is 
a unifier of peoples is nothing new. The following chapter will discuss both the early 
Eurasianists of the Russian Civil War era and the European New Right. It will be 
demonstrated that both movements have exercised a profound influence on Dugin’s 
worldview not only by his own admission but by the similarities that can be seen between 
his and his intellectual antecedents’ ideas. By discussing the two major movements, it is 
hoped that this project will successfully trace a sort of “intellectual family tree” in which 
we can ultimately understand Dugin’s philosophy of Neo-Eurasianism as simultaneously 
a continuation of some of the ideas espoused by the early Eurasianists and the New Right 
but at the same time a departure from it due to his fundamentally Perennial Traditionalist 
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worldview. 
 
Chapter 2: The Early Eurasianists, Lev Gumilev, and the Nouvelle Droite 
 
During the Russian Civil War a plethora of constitutive myths flourished not only 
in Russia proper but also in the Russian émigré community. Indeed the Civil War was in 
many ways a war between competing constitutive myths. For the Bolsheviks, the 
meaning of Russia was defined by its war against international capitalism. With the 
creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 Russia became a nominally equal partner in a union 
of politically like-minded but linguistically and culturally diverse republics. Generally 
speaking, prior to Stalin the chief paradigm through which communist discourse was 
viewed was always that of class. According to the communist narrative, to be Russian 
was to be part of a larger international proletarian revolution. On the other hand the 
White movement was deeply divided. Monarchists who fought against the Bolsheviks 
championed a pre-revolutionary adoration for Tsar and Church. Their Russia was a 
Russia very similar to the Russia that existed before the First World War. Others wanted a 
liberalized and democratized Russia and largely viewed Russia as a part of Europe, thus 
connecting their “imagined nation” to the Enlightenment and Western liberal apostles of 
free market capitalism. Still others created a completely new approach to Russian history 
and nationhood. 
The Eurasianists were a relatively small and diverse group of Russian émigrés 
who initially fled to Central Europe and the Balkans after the Bolshevik seizure of power. 
Led by the geographer and economist Petr Savitsky, the ethnographer Nikolai 
Trubetzkoy, and the historian George Vernadsky and containing linguists, philosophers 
and theologians, the Eurasianists were an eclectic mix of intellectuals.61 Simultaneously 
revolutionary and conservative and fascinated by Benito Mussolini’s Fascist experiment 
in Italy, they articulated a complex critique of previous notions of Russian identity while 
                                                 
61 George Vernadsky is an especially important figure in the early Eurasianist movement not least of all 
because some of his work has been published in English. In 1927 he immigrated to the United States after 
being offered a position as an assistant professor of history at Yale University. During his life he wrote 
profusely on Russian history and historiography. In his work he argued that Russia was fundamentally 
different from the West. Rather like the other Eurasianists, Vernadsky emphasized an Asian component that 
has always been present in Russian culture and politics. For more information see George Vernadsky, The 
Mongols and Russia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), George Vernadsky, Kievan Russia (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) and George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969). 
32 
 
 
maintaining Russia’s “otherness” from Europe.62 Fundamentally, the Eurasianists posited 
a romantic territorially-based understanding that theorized that Russian history, as well as 
Russianness, was defined by the territory it occupied. 
Despite their unique approach to Russian history, the movement itself made little 
impact on contemporary discourse. This was in part because of the movement’s 
factionalism; the Eurasianists were deeply split on their approach to communism and the 
Bolshevik victory in 1922.63 Some Eurasianists, devoted Orthodox Christians and critics 
of rationalism, were deeply skeptical of the atheistic and materialistic worldview 
espoused by communism. Thus for Trubetzkoy and others of like mind the Soviet Union 
was an eternal enemy. After the communist victory in the civil war many contemporaries 
feared that the red menace would spread successfully to the rest of the world. However, 
when the world revolution did not happen and the Soviet Union adopted the New 
Economic Policy some Eurasianists started to consider the Bolshevik revolution as not a 
truly communist one, but a Russian one. Seeing in the New Economic Policy as a more 
contained version of socialist economics and the Soviet Union as a multi-national state 
no longer encumbered by centuries of monarchy, many Eurasianists believed that with 
their influence the Soviet Union might be transformed into a state more suitable to their 
worldview.64 Others, more dubious, maintained that the Soviet Union was a manifestation 
of Russian “Westernism” and needed to be completely done away with. The Eurasianists 
never posited a comprehensive political platform. Indeed, they were never able to decide 
as a whole whether or not Eurasianism should remain an academic school of thought or 
an actual popular movement. Nonetheless, taken as a whole the fractious proponents of 
Eurasianism proposed a new historical, quasi-religious and territorial myth-symbol 
complex for Russia. 
The relationship between Russia and the east had been largely ambivalent 
throughout the Imperial period. Central and East Asia were largely seen as a target of 
territorial and economic expansion for the Russian empire. For the Russian state as well 
as many conservatives, Russia was culturally closer to Europe than Asia. The 
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historiography of the contemporary Russian state traced its roots largely through Kievan 
Rus’ and Muscovy. Russia was the “Third Rome,” heir to the Greek Orthodox cultural 
and religious tradition. The Eurasianists, however, criticized the emphasis laid on 
Russia’s Byzantine heritage as euro-centric and instead underscored Russia’s Eastern 
heritage through a romanticizing of the Steppe and a historical heritage bequeathed by 
the Mongols and nomadism. Thus they distanced themselves from Slavophilism and Pan-
Slavism, maintaining that non-Russian Slavdom was a part of Europe. They concluded 
that early Russian history was a meeting between “forest and steppe” – Russian and 
Turanian.65 
Eurasianist historiography focuses on the Mongol Yoke period from the 
fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. During this period all of the Russian states 
submitted to and became vassals of the Golden Horde. While other Russians decried this 
period in Russian history as a great injustice and lauded the heroics of Ivan III of 
Muscovy for finally ending Russian vassalage, the Eurasianists saw the Golden Horde’s 
dominion as fundamentally healthy. During the period under the “Mongol Yoke,” 
Eurasianists contended that many Russian nobles intermarried with members of the 
Golden Horde, which served to reawaken Russia’s true identity. Sedentary village life, 
the hallmark of life for many conservatives, was to be replaced by a nomadism of the 
spirit.66 With the retreat of the Golden Horde and the collapse of Mongolian hegemony 
over much of the Eurasian continent, it became the Russian people’s mission to reunite 
much of the Mongol world. Russia’s identity as a universal unifier was presumably 
inherited from its Mongol past. The Mongol Empire at its furthest extent stretched from 
what is now Manchuria to the Hungarian plains and from southern Siberia to the 
Himalaya Mountains. Some Eurasianists believed that it was Russia’s destiny to rule over 
a similarly sized space. Russia’s geographic position, like that of the Mongol Khanate of 
Genghis and Kublai Khan, gave it a certain historical predilection for empire building. 
However, this new empire that the Russians were destined to build was not to be 
one that necessarily centered purely on Russian interests. Rather, it was to a universal 
empire. Indeed, Russia could not exist authentically without empire.67 The Eurasianists 
believed that only a country that exhibited a dual nature, being of both the West and the 
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East could be one of the successful “centers of the world.”68 The Mongolian empire justly 
ruled over much of the Indo-Chinese world and at its height reached the Mediterranean 
world. Containing Christians, Muslims, Buddhists of varying shades and countless local 
religions, the realm conquered by Genghis Khan’s was fashioned a “United Empire of 
Mankind.”69 Because the Russians were now heir to the Mongol heritage, they too could 
form a universal empire that included countless nations and religions. This new Eurasian 
empire, encompassing as it did various peoples and religions, could not take on a single 
cultural or ethnic identity. Rather, the founding identity for this collective empire was a 
quasi-religious belief in the Eurasian people’s unity through a common destiny.  Russia, 
being neither fully of the West nor of the East, was the connecting element that fostered a 
universally just empire. 
The Eurasian supranational identity, grounded as it was in a Mongolian and 
nomadic myth-symbol complex also drew heavily on the belief in the trait-forming 
abilities of territory and geography on peoples. Furthermore, they generally continued the 
narrative that the Russian (or Eurasian) world was a third continent – neither wholly 
European nor Asian. The Eurasianists maintained that geography was the chief means of 
explaining the unity of a greater Eurasian culture and that there was a fundamentally 
organic link between a geographic space and a people’s culture. The geographer Petr 
Savitsky proposed the idea of “topogenesis,” in order to prove scientifically a link 
between nature and human beings.70 Furthermore the pseudoscientific Russian discipline 
of geosophy claimed that human history was not necessarily determined by their 
environment and geography but rather that geography and human beings had a reciprocal 
relationship. Eurasianists contended that the soil could expose a hidden meaning of past 
and future events. The subtle determinism of geosophy and Savitsky’s theory of 
topogenesis attributed a mystical culture-forming aspect to land that aided in the creation 
of national identities. 
Despite the inability of the Eurasianists to indicate exactly what constituted the 
borders of Eurasia, Savitsky and other Eurasianists claimed that the natural unity of the 
Eurasian territory could be scientifically explained. They argued that Eurasia”…is the 
only country whose flora, fauna, soil, and climate are so perfectly harmonious…” and 
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that it represented as yet an undiscovered natural law.71 Eurasia was composed of four 
horizontal botanical strips of land and soil extending from east to west; taiga, tundra, 
desert and steppe. These strips of land were intersected by three major plains: the 
Siberian plain, the Turkistan plain and the plain from the White Sea to the Caucasus. This 
diverse geographic system demanded an array of various methods for humans to sustain 
themselves be it through sedentary farming, hunting, or herding. Thus the geographic 
arrangement of Eurasia, according to Eurasianists, was a manifestation Eurasia’s 
universal mission. The Russian steppe was perhaps the most important of the types of 
land present in Eurasia. The steppe, spanning horizontally along much of Central and 
East Asia across multiple civilizations, constituted Eurasia’s own “horizontal” mission. 
The sheer scope of this geographic facet of Eurasia proved to the Eurasianists the 
inherent expansionist character of Russia. 
While the early Eurasian supranationalism maintained that Russians and non-
Russian Eurasians were a historically-united community of destiny, some Eurasianist 
scholars also attempted to unite the various peoples of Eurasia through cultural and 
linguistic approaches. Of the Eurasianists only a few including Trubetzkoy believed that 
the Russian people were at least somewhat related to the Slavs of the Balkans with their 
linguistic and religious similarities. 72  Conversely, other Eurasianists emphasized that 
despite the linguistic links between Russians and other Slavs, non-Russian Slavs 
belonged mostly to the Romano-Germanic cultural zone. The Russians, on the other 
hand, were part of a cultural zone that included Finno-Urgic and Turkic peoples. Indeed, 
the Eurasianists maintained that genetic and racial kinship was irrelevant to 
understanding identity; rather, what mattered was where a culture or language was 
originally formed. Thus the theory of topogenesis put forward by Savitsky maintained 
that geography was essential to understanding the evolution of cultures and languages. 
The Russians, having developed their language in Eurasia, were exclusively a Eurasian 
people. 
Furthermore, the Eurasian peoples, linked as they were by geography and culture 
to one another, also exhibited a linguistic unity. The linguist Roman Jakobson used three 
major criteria to demonstrate a relative linguistic unity among the various Eurasian 
peoples; tone, correlation of palatalization, and territorial continuity. Eurasia, according 
                                                 
71 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 33.  
72 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 35. 
36 
 
 
to Jakobson, was an area whose populace all spoke languages that lacked complex tone 
or palatalization. The various Eurasian languages, admitted Jakobson, might not have 
originated near one another and might remain diverse, but they were nonetheless 
evolving toward the same characteristics and shared the same large geographical space.73 
Again, the importance of geography and its effect on language and culture to the early 
Eurasianists’ worldview was paramount.74 
The early Eurasianists of the interwar period never formed a unified doctrine. 
They were a collection of like-minded individuals who tended to be religious 
revolutionaries. They saw Russia as the historically destined unifier of Eurasia and 
envisioned an empire bereft of traditional monarchy as well as European parliamentary 
democracy and capitalism. They remained, however, largely devoted to Orthodoxy while 
paying homage to Eurasia’s religious diversity. The Eurasianists proposed something of 
an authoritarian conception of a new Eurasian state, a diverse empire that represented a 
communal harmony between different cultures and religions but nonetheless all devoted 
to a single central government. They articulated a romantic myth-symbol complex 
containing a cult of diversity defined the Russian nation as a destined unifier of a great 
empire. Despite their failure to have an effect on the Soviet Union and their dispersal by 
the end of the Second World War, the early Eurasianists were in part a precursor to 
Alexander Dugin’s own neo-Eurasianist philosophy. 
While the Eurasianists posited a largely religious and cultural definition of 
Russianness, the ethnic theories of Lev Gumilev are an example a purely biological and 
pseudo-scientific understanding of the Russian nation that is defined purely by a 
biological determinism and social Darwinism. His work is said by some scholars such as 
Anton Shekhovtsov to have had a direct influence on the geopolitical theories of 
Alexander Dugin.75 
Much of Gumilev’s life was marked by political dissidence. From praising anti-
Stalinist poetry to being implicated in a terrorist attack on a Leningrad party official, 
Gumilev was arrested and imprisoned in the forced labor camps of the Gulag system 
multiple times. Despite his history of arrests, he was able to become one of the most 
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celebrated scholars in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death. Originally a scholar of East 
Asian history and culture who wrote extensively on the Huns and Mongols, Gumilev 
eventually developed an interest in broader questions of how societies and ethnicities 
develop and their relationship with one another. Ultimately, Gumilev developed a theory 
of history and ethnicity that was said to transcend the humanities, positing that human 
history could be predicted.76 
In his book Ethnogensis and the Biosphere Gumilev presented an expansive 
explanation of how civilizations such as the Mongols, having been seemingly quiet and 
calm for so long, erupted into a great frenzy of activity, conquering huge swathes of land 
and ruling other civilizations only to collapse just as suddenly. His answer to this 
question was what he called “passionarity.” This phenomenon, determined largely by 
natural forces such as the undulation of solar radiation levels, gives great bursts of 
activity and inspiration to certain peoples depending on where they live on the globe.77 
This passionarity leads to bursts of artistic and architectural achievements as well as to 
the creation of great empires. Ethnic groups, hithero seen by outsiders as mostly isolated 
and unassuming, in a burst of passionarity were able to form complex state systems and 
advanced military technologies to defeat and conquer their neighbors. 78  Each ethnic 
group can then be seen as vessels of individuals who are themselves vessels of the ethnic 
group’s potential for passionarity; such individuals include Napoleon Bonaparte, 
Alexander the Great, and Genghis Khan. The ethnic group, what Gumilev called the 
“ethnos,” then, was a biological and organic entity that could be observed as collective 
whole. However, individuals and great leaders within the ethnos represent a sort of soul 
or spirit of the rest of the ethnos and led it to do great things.79 They are fundamentally 
unconscious bearers of the ethnos’ greater will. 
According to Gumilev, it is a scientific reality that each ethnic group has a 
prescribed lifespan from 1,200 to 1,500 years.80 Once an ethnic group emerged, it went 
through a series of pre-determined life stages not unlike the life stages of a human being. 
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Ethnogenesis is divided into several life stages; the first three hundred years of an ethnos’ 
life is its early “childhood.” After that, another three hundred years of adolescence 
characterizes the second stage. Thirdly, the ethnos goes through one hundred and fifty 
years of conquest. After that, there is six hundred years of consolidation in which the 
ethnos acquires an ideological foundation and a reliance on technology but dies 
spiritually and internally. The final two stages of an ethnos’ lifespan are characterized by 
a gradual decline and the extinction of the group or it becoming a sort of “relic” like the 
Australian aborigines.81 Thus human history was largely pre-determined by biological 
and solar factors. 
Placing the theory of ethnogenesis into a historical context, Gumilev’s 
historiography resembles that of the interwar Eurasianists. Like the Eurasianists, he saw 
Russia as a constitutive part of a larger Eurasian identity. He believed that during the 
sixteenth centuries the Russians, Mongols and Tatars came together to form a larger 
ethnic group, or a super-ethnos. One thousand years prior to the formation of the 
Eurasian super-ethnos a Latin-Germanic super-ethnos was formed in Western Europe 
which came to represent a constant threat to the Eurasian one. While one current in 
Russian historiography praises Russia for defeating the Mongols and thus saving the rest 
of Christendom, Gumilev emphasized that it was rather fortuitous that the Mongols had 
invaded Russia which was then protected and insulated from a Western invasion. Like the 
early Eurasianists, Gumilev praised the Mongols of the Golden Horde, maintaining that 
their religious tolerance allowed the Russians to maintain their organic ties with 
Orthodox Christianity. 82  The Mongol period is described as a healthy symbiotic 
relationship between the Russians and the Mongols. The period served to protect and 
strengthen the Russian ethnos. However, according to Gumilev, once the Golden Horde 
adopted Islam it attached itself to another super-ethnos, an Islamic one. Thus, the 
Russians became heir to an empire of the Steppes. Marlene Laruelle correctly notes that 
this represents one of the many contradictions within Gumilev’s theory of ethnogenesis.83 
If ethnogenesis is a fundamentally biological process that can be scientifically observed, 
then how can the inclusion and exclusion of an ethnos into a super-ethnos be based on the 
assumption of a new faith? Moreover, Gumilev’s ideas on the positive results of Russian 
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mixing with Turks and Mongols throughout history only go so far. Whereas the 
Eurasianists were content with the idea of Russians having a biological blood tie to 
Mongols and other Asian peoples, Gumilev stressed the importance of keeping ethnic 
groups biologically separated and championed endogamy. With interbreeding came the 
dilution of the gene pool and the ethnos’ potential passionarity. This biological sentiment 
was quite unlike the Eurasiansts’ own romantic sentiments concerning the relationship 
between Russia and its neighbors. 
Despite the contradictions within his own historiosophy when taking into account 
his theory of ethnogenesis, Gumilev’s conception of Russian nationhood largely 
resembles that of the Eurasianists. Both espouse a belief that the Russian nation, be it 
through a community of destiny or a deterministic cultural fusion of Russian and Central 
Asian ethnic groups, is only authentically realized as part of a larger whole. Both the 
Eurasianists and Gumilev professed a belief in the supremacy of the organic community 
over individuals throughout history. In addition, both Eurasianists and Gumilev 
completely rejected a European identity for Russia, and rather emphasized that Russia 
was a category unto itself that embraced an Eastern heritage more than a Western one. 
Dugin himself has admitted that he owes a debt of gratitude to the Early 
Eurasianists for much of his own understanding of Eurasia and its historical mission. 
Dugin argues that the Eurasianists saw both Tsarist and Communist Russia as 
fundamentally modern and secular. The former emphased the need to form a secular 
nationalism during the later years of its existence through the façade of “Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, and Nationality.” Whereas Soviet Russia underscored an economic or class 
understanding of the Russian nation through the proletariat.84 Both regimes, according to 
Dugin, merely imitated the West. Conversely, according to Dugin, the early Eurasianists 
provided a much needed synthetic understanding of the Eurasian community by giving 
“the highest possible estimation to the multi-national (imperial) nature of the Russian 
State. They were especially attentive to the Turkish factor. The role of the heritage of 
Gengis-Khan, trustee of the Tatar statehood assimilated by Moscow in the XVI century, 
was seen as a decisive turn of Russia to the East, to its origins, to its own values.”85 In an 
interview with the pro-Dugin North American-based webzine Open Revolt, Dugin argued 
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that the early Eurasianists were the first Russians to understand that the Russian people 
were defined first by their religion and their connection to a “unity of destiny” with non-
Slavic peoples such as Turks, Caucasians, Mongols and the peoples of Siberia.86 Thus 
Dugin articulates an understanding of Russia, similar to that of the early Eurasianists, as 
spanning a wide range of peoples whose unity was based more on geography and a 
mystical connection than religious or cultural homogeneity.  
In approaching both interwar Eurasianism and the theories espoused by Lev 
Gumilev, it is easy to see the similarities between them and the work of Alexander Dugin. 
All three espouse a belief in the uniqueness of a communitarian Russia. Furthermore 
Eurasianism as well as Gumilev and Dugin see the expansion of Russian territory as 
natural and desirable – even pre-destined. Thirdly, all three see the West, or at least many 
of the ideas produced there, as a threat to Russia. The main point of divergence between 
is the question of race. While the Eurasianists and Dugin, as will be discussed later, 
define the Eurasian community in largely religious or cultural terms, Gumilev 
unequivocally maintains a racial view of man. Indeed, Gumilev’s historical philosophy 
can be seen as a case for biological determinism that leaves little room for God or 
spirituality. Unlike Dugin’s ideas, Gumilev’s theories are scientifically reductionist in 
their argument that an ethnic group’s actions and history are essentially predetermined by 
their level of passionarity. Furthermore, while Dugin can be understood as profoundly 
influenced by the early Eurasianists he also represents an important departure from them 
in that he is a Traditionalist whose worldview is more esoteric and religious than the 
early Eurasianists’. 
 
Chapter 2.1: The European New Right 
 
On May 21, 2013 the French right-wing historian Dominque Venner committed 
suicide. In the midst of around 1,500 other people in and around the Notre Dame 
Cathedral, he shot himself at its altar. A determined opponent to the recent legalization of 
gay marriage and a vehement activist against the influx of non-European immigrants to 
France, Venner believed that only through a violent and shocking display could he 
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awaken the French masses from their apathy.87 A historian and political activist, Venner 
worked with Alain de Benoist along with other members of the far right. The shocking 
suicide let to an outpour of sentiment from politicians and thinkers of the right. Marine le 
Pen, the leader of the Front Nationale, a socially conservative and nationalist party, and 
the rightist academic Bruno Gollnisch expressed their deepest sympathies. Less than 
twenty-four hours after Venner’s suicide, however, the feminist group Femen staged a 
mock suicide at the cathedral; a topless demonstration with “may fascists rest in hell” 
written on their chests.88 
Venner’s suicide represents only one instance of a call to action that has resonated 
in much of the post-war right. Disparaging of liberal democracy and decrying what they 
see as the homogenization of particular European identities, members of the far right 
throughout the Western world have been calling for a complete transformation of the 
global order. Against American global hegemony, consumerism and multiculturalism 
they propose a multi-polar world that would mean the end of American cultural and 
political influence. Despite a generally agreed-upon platform of what they are against, the 
contemporary far right is deeply fragmented. Some on the far right are no more than 
isolated would-be terrorists who maintain that the only way to affect real change is 
through violent action against the state, political opponents, and immigrants. Others such 
as the Greek political party Golden Dawn utilize Nazi paraphernalia such as the swastika 
and Hitler salute to shock spectators. Still others, however, follow a more cautious and 
long-term approach to competing for political power. Described by many observers as the 
New Right, this group is composed of academics and intellectuals who are critics of 
liberalism and modernity. Inspired by the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, they have 
appropriated his approach to gaining power by attempting to participate in a new type of 
politics. While many political and interest groups attempt to gain power through elections 
or even sometimes force, the New Right maintains that the only way to affect real change 
is by gaining cultural hegemony by changing the values of elites through educational and 
media institutions. Thus the European New Right’s fundamental strategy is borrowed 
from the left. 
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One of the most important intellectual organs of the New Right is the Groupement 
de Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne or the Research and Study 
Group for European Civilization (GRECE). Founded in 1968 by the writer and journalist 
Alain de Benoist, it is a religious and nationalist think tank that has been the most 
important venue for far right discourse for the past half century. Founded by forty 
individuals from separate nationalist and dissident groups, GRECE formed a discourse 
that has challenged contemporary accepted political and social norms and formed a stage 
upon which other like-minded rightists could participate through their 
journals Éléments and Nouvelle École. Intellectuals of the European New Right have for 
the past decades participated in multiple conferences and debates, platforms in which 
intellectuals from different countries can participate. As early as 1992, Alexander Dugin 
and Alain de Benoist have had a cordial relationship. While never always in full 
agreement with Benoist, Dugin’s own journal was clearly inspired by Benoist’s Éléments. 
One of the means by which the European New Right has sought to overturn what 
it perceives to be the apathy of European peoples concerning globalization and the loss of 
individual cultures’ particularities is through spiritual revival. However, while many of 
the far right, particularly the reactionary right, have usually championed Christianity as 
Europe’s traditional religion, many New Rightists denounce Christianity as one of the 
chief problems of contemporary Western society. Rather, many among the New Right 
look to the revival of ancient European paganism with its vitalism and cult of masculinity 
as one of the only means of restoring Europe’s sense of self. The New Right’s hostility 
towards Christianity can be explained by examining its historiosophy, how it emplots 
European history and how it conceptualizes time. 
According to the New Right the natural religion of the European peoples is 
paganism. Various tribes worshipped different gods and practiced different rites. 
Nonetheless, all the pre-Christian tribal religions shared a reverence for nature, heroism, 
and believed that “life has no purpose other than itself.”89 Furthermore, they believed in 
the cyclical nature of time and peoples; like the seasons peoples and eras go through an 
endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. The numerous European pagan practices prior 
to the advent of Christianity, then, contained a cult of action and a morality system that 
allowed for shades of grey rather than absolute criteria in appraising right and wrong. 
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Truth to the pagan was not a universal truth, and what was good and what was evil was 
not an objective reality, but subjective and dependent on many variables. Furthermore, 
the gods of a particular tribe or nation were just that; theirs. European pagans had no use 
for evangelical missions or holy wars. Accordingly, the New Right asserts, paganism was 
given to more nuance than Christianity is, and Europe’s traditional religions were thus 
more open-minded and tolerant of other peoples and ways of life. 
The New Right argues that truth and morality were subjective ideas to European 
pagans, and it was not necessary to reify those concepts. However, how one conducted 
oneself was not subjective. No matter what the circumstance the pre-Christian pagan 
always valued honor, loyalty, and heroism and disparaged cowardice.90 Figures such as 
Alain de Benoist contend that paganism was a religion of works, not one of faith. Even 
with the introduction of Christianity the European peoples were only converted after a 
combination of bribery, torture, and trickery. Ultimately, the only way that Christianity 
could take hold in Europe was through adaptation to the European situation, depicting 
Christ not as a fallen god but focused on the resurrected aspect of Christ, seeing him as a 
god of victory.91 
Just like Nietzsche, Alain de Benoist sees Christianity’s more or less dominance 
of European culture as nothing less than “catastrophic.”92 For him, it is the cause of the 
unrealistic egalitarian universalism seen in both Marxism and liberalism that has led to 
the deracination and slow death of European civilization. Christianity, an oriental “desert 
religion” was and remains an alien religion opposed to the vitality and life-affirming 
spirituality of European forest dwellers. Christianity represents nothing less than the 
complete dismantlement of the European spirit and is ultimately a totalitarian doctrine. 
New Rightists maintain that Christianity’s disastrous consequences can be seen 
throughout European history all the way to the mass murders and gulag system of the 
Soviet Union. Christianity’s conceptualization of time and history, that existence had a 
definite starting point and a fixed, divinely determined end point has doomed the 
European peoples to a false sense of reality. Mono-linear time, as opposed to pagan ideas 
of cyclical time, then, creates a narrative of progress which maintains that eventually the 
whole world will be led into a utopia; Christ’s millennial reign. In addition to its 
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opposition to Christianity’s sense of progress and time, the New Right argues against 
Christianity’s metaphysical dualism. Maintaining that European paganism valued 
diversity through its variety of tribal deities and its lack of evangelical spirit, the New 
Right claims that Christianity changed the way Europeans thought about reality. 
Christianity introduced a stringent definition of the truth; questions of morality were seen 
in shades of black and white with seldom any nuance.93  By cutting themselves off from 
their pagan roots, Christian Europeans began to believe in the equality of all souls before 
God, and similarly, believed in an evangelizing mission to convert all souls to a one true 
God.94 This “Bolshevism of Antiquity,” according to the New Right, would later be 
secularized and utilized for other universal missions.95 
The New Right has created a historical narrative that holds the advent of 
Christianity and its direct epistemological effects on the formation of modern ideologies 
such as liberalism and Marxism as directly responsible for what it sees as the slow death 
of particularism today. In short, they argue that the Late Middle Ages was the last time 
traditional pagan virtues held any real influence on European civilization. During this 
period, the pagan ideals of a warrior king, honor and loyalty were still ensconced in the 
popular ideals of chivalry and divinely ordained kingship. However, the Reformation 
marked the final blow to European paganism. With the rise of first Lutheranism and then 
other forms of Protestantism, Christianity as a whole unwittingly let loose the floodgates 
to skepticism, which led to the necessity to tolerate individual interpretations of the 
Bible, spiritual ennui and finally secularism. This secularism manifested itself initially as 
a new societal focus on science. Renaissance humanism gave way to an increasingly 
rationalistic approach to the world. The natural world then became “…measured, 
analyzed and rendered into the language of mathematics.”96 Eventually, rationalism was 
utilized as a universal model to be applied to society and the state.  Rationalism became a 
part of the discourse of revolutionaries of what would later be known as the “left,” which 
sought overturn centuries-old traditions and hierarchies. 
Since the seventeenth century, according to the New Right, science and 
rationalism have effectively replaced spiritual values and tradition as the legitimizing 
ideas behind authority and statehood. The rise of capitalism, intellectually justified by 
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Protestantism and rationalism, combined with further religious dissolution and the 
centralizing tendencies of monarchs to create new societies. The new model of the state 
was created in order to maximize administrative efficiency and economic profit, 
regardless of a culturally-specific common good. This secular rationalism was manifested 
in the liberalism of the eighteenth century and the French revolution. Positing a secular 
universalism, liberalism and later Marxism declared their materialistic doctrines to be 
universally applicable and historically determined.97 Furthermore, the false narrative of 
eternal progress present in liberalism and Marxism both foster a culture of “liberation,” 
which according to the New Right, strives towards ever-more spurious “liberations.” 
Starting with an emancipation from God or the divine, liberalism has created a culture in 
which ethnic, cultural, and gender identities, once considered natural and inherent to the 
individual, are easily taken up and discarded at will in the name of a postmodern cult of 
individualism. 
The New Right, embodied in GRECE, is also deeply critical of contemporary 
conceptions of democracy. In place of what they see as an American-centric idea of 
democracy that is used as a universal model, they argue for a diversity of government 
types, maintaining that different peoples require different forms of government. In The 
Problem of Democracy, Benoist argues for an ethnic understanding of the history of 
democracy. He maintains that democratic tendencies among pre-modern peoples such as 
Athenian Greeks and Norse Icelanders were founded upon a common rootedness. 
Citizenship and participation in politics was a manifestation of their belonging to a 
common homeland and sharing a common background, thus endowing them with 
common interests.98 In essence, there was a “cultural cohesion” in Athens and other city-
states.99 Sharing common interests, values, myths, histories and a shared homeland, the 
peoples of the Greek city-states were able to effectively administer themselves 
democratically while still respecting hierarchy and tradition. In contrast, the modern 
democratic process is organized around atomized individuals selfishly competing for 
personal interests with no regard for the greater community.100 Indeed, contemporary 
European countries such as France and the United Kingdom, inundated as they are with 
foreign immigrants no longer represent societies for which the first iteration of 
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democracy was meant for. 
Seeing in Europe a crisis of identity and a threat to its survival, the European New 
Right has created a fundamentally new identity and myth-symbol complex to articulate a 
European identity. Opposed to what they see as the universalism of Christianity that has 
manifested itself in virtually all left-wing projects, GRECE has created a pre-Christian 
myth-symbol complex that extolls the virtues of a diverse European paganism. Utilizing 
mostly Norse mythological symbols, images of Odin, ravens, and runes have become an 
important component of the New Right’s call for Europeans to revert back to their 
ancestral roots.101 Paradoxically, the New Right has utilized a narrative of pre-Christian 
Europe’s religious diversity to unite culturally disparate peoples into a supra-national 
identity. Furthermore, the GRECE articulates a fall-redemption narrative that details an 
idealized pagan Europe that has been duped or forced into accepting culture-killing 
Christianity and its inevitably totalitarian ideologies of Marxism and liberalism. 
Embodied by the rootless and mercantile United States, Europe has been subjected to a 
slow spiritual and ethnic death. Only through the revitalization of its sense of self through 
pagan spirituality and an appreciation of their common history can European peoples 
unite under a federal system that defends their particularities against the vagaries of 
modernity. 
Today the New Right is not only represented by GRECE members but a diverse 
group of thinkers largely in Europe as well as North America. Communicating through 
online webzines, podcasts and journals, they all share a deep distrust of modern society 
and American hegemony as well as a profound dislike of multiculturalism. While some 
such as Benoist call for a resurrection of Europe’s Pagan past, others are more 
comfortable remaining with Christianity. Still others like Alexander Dugin, inspired by 
the extreme anti-modernism of Julius Evola and other Traditionalists, have turned to the 
reactionary doctrine of Traditionalism in an attempt to exorcise the modern demons of 
contemporary Western society.  
On the surface, Neo-Eurasianism as espoused by Dugin is another example of 
Russian nationalist nostalgia. For some, the Russian Empire of the nineteenth century and 
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before represented a golden age of traditional Russian values. For others, the Soviet 
Union was the ideal guarantor of Soviet, and thus Russian, great power status. Dugin is 
indeed nostalgic. However, while Dugin truly mourns the dissolution of the Soviet 
Empire, likening Russia to Germany right after the First World War, his expansionist 
project utilizes neither Tsarist nor Soviet symbols.102 Rather, Dugin mourns the tragedy 
of what he sees as a truly global loss. Modernity and liberalism, he argues, have deprived 
humanity of its connection to the sacred, and have stripped many cultures of their natural, 
divinely-ordained traditions, religions, and hierarchies. His ideas are fundamentally 
grounded in a genuine belief in a Perennial Tradition as articulated by René Guénon and 
Julius Evola. 
The above analysis represents a sort of intellectual genealogy in which Dugin’s 
major secular influences, the early Eurasianist movement and the Nouvelle Droite, are 
discussed in order to place Dugin within a broader century-long anti-liberal context. The 
following chapter will emphasize how Neo-Eurasianism, while sharing both movements’ 
anti-liberal and anti-democratic and supranational tendencies, also represents a departure 
from both the strict Orthodoxy espoused by the early Eurasianists and the pagan vitalism 
argued for an esoteric Traditionalism. In addition, the following chapter will engage the 
scholarly debate over Dugin and his alleged fascism by discussing whether Dugin meets 
the first criteria of a fascist minimum – that of a palingenetic mythic core. Scholars such 
as Andres Umland and Anton Shekhovtsov have argued that Dugin must be understood 
as a fascist first and foremost. His religious, mystical and fundamentally anti-modern 
language is ultimately more or less a façade to protect his more unpopular ideas. Upon 
initial observation the conclusion drawn by Umland and others does make sense. Fascism 
has historically often utilized esoteric and mystical symbolism and ideas in order to 
harken back to a long-forgotten idealized past. So too does the Perennial Traditionalism 
that Dugin, it will be demonstrated, partakes in. Traditionalists such as Julius Evola and, 
undoubtedly Dugin, see in fascist movements potential allies who, sharing the same 
hostilities towards democracy, liberalism, egalitarianism and consumerism, might yet be 
instilled with true Traditional values. Julius Evola, a contemporary to both Italian 
Fascism and National Socialism was eventually deeply disappointed by both movements. 
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While National Socialism might have utilized esoteric symbols and ideas as a means of 
inspiring the masses during rallies and articulating a justification for Aryan world 
hegemony, National Socialism emphasized modern values and tactics such as secularism, 
technology, and populism. Conversely, Traditionalism and Traditionalists, such as the late 
Julius Evola and currently Alexander Dugin, have repeatedly condemned fascism, 
particularly National Socialism, for its (pseudo-)scientific biological determinism, 
secularism and reliance on technology and new forms of authority rather than traditional 
ones such as clerics and aristocrats who – according to Tradition – still maintain a thin 
connection to the sacred hierarchies of an imagined past. 
 
 
Chapter 3:  Anti-Modernism in the Perennial Traditionalism and Dugin’s 
Neo-Eurasianism: Palingenesis or Reaction? 
 
In order to measure whether or not Dugin’s worldview meets the first criteria of 
the fascist minimum – a palingenetic mythic core – we must explore his fundamental 
religious worldview. Perennial Traditionalism is a religious philosophy that maintains 
that most of the world’s religions share a single universal truth which is the foundation 
for all religious knowledge. As a worldview that allows for diverse representations of that 
truth, it can be said to characterize many religious and political dissidents of the twentieth 
century who saw in modernity a universal fall from grace. The origins of the idea of a 
Perennial Tradition can be traced to the Renaissance era. Martin Sedgwick’s work, 
Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the 
Twentieth Century, points out that the term philosophia perennis (Perennial Philosophy) 
was used in 1540 by a Catholic scholar to explain one of the main ideas proposed by 
Marsilio Ficino.103 Ficino believed that the revival of Plato and his ideas as an object of 
discussion was a gift from God to offer philosophical arguments for Christianity. Ficino, 
then, elevated Plato beside Christianity as having equal authority as both were “lawful” 
religions.104 
According to Ficino, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Judaism and native pagan 
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religions all shared a spiritual lineage dating back to a foundational spiritual truth.105 This 
spiritual truth was founded on the alleged discovery of theological writings supposedly 
written by Hermes Trismegistus, a mythical ancient pagan thought to be a contemporary 
of Moses. Trismegistus also supposedly practiced a belief in a universal truth as well as 
alchemy, which further helped Ficino popularize his belief in a perennial philosophy.106 
His writings, later discovered to be forgeries, were translated by Ficino. They provided a 
means of religious syncretism; the rites of paganism, Jewish Kabballah, and later Islam 
and Hinduism were practiced by religious Traditionalists who saw them all as 
expressions of a larger universal and divine truth. Traditionalism as a syncretic religious 
belief has survived in various forms through secret societies and occult ideologies into 
the twenty first-century. 
In an interview on May 17, 2014 with Open Revolt a North American-based 
organization that supports Alexander Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, Dugin explained 
his intellectual background; 
“…In my early youth I was deeply inspired by Traditionalism of Rene Guenon 
and Julius Evola.  That was my definitive choice of camp – on the side of sacred 
Tradition against the modern (and post-modern) world. This choice and all consequences 
are still there in the present. I firmly stand for spiritual and religious values against actual 
decadent materialist and perverted culture. Traditionalism was and rests central as the 
philosophic focus of all my later developments.”107 
René Guénon was the first major Traditionalist thinker of the first half of the 
twentieth century. An Indologist who sought to prove Hinduism’s Traditional origins, 
Guénon was deeply pessimistic about the course of Western civilization.  Modernity, 
Guénon argued, postulated a false narrative of progress that was typified by democracy 
and Marxism. However according to Guénon the modern age was actually a dark age of 
humanity – what Hindus called the Kali Yuga.108 Guénon believed that prior to the advent 
of modernity and its hedonistic individualism individuals and society were closer to a 
universal god through a society’s local religious tradition. Correct, divinely-ordained 
traditions of hierarchy, proper gender relations, and humility were established. Modernity 
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with its secularism and emphasis on rationalism and egalitarianism had effectively 
severed much of humanity’s connection to the divine. He stressed the “initiatic” potential 
of Traditionalism.109 Only through the proper initiation of an individual into Tradition, 
drawing on rituals and doctrine that still maintained a fragment of the Perennial 
Tradition, could an individual begin to find his way back to the divine. However, Western 
society, being the birthplace of modernity, was also the least likely to recover spiritual 
authenticity – particularly due to Christianity having been largely subjugated by 
modernity. Rather, Guénon called on Eastern religions, whose connection to the Perennial 
Tradition had as of yet not been sullied by modern rationalism to bring salvation to the 
West and save Western civilization.110 Although he eventually converted to Sufi Islam 
and lived out his life in Egypt, Guénon for a time believed that Hinduism was the religion 
through which the West could rediscover its connection to Tradition. 
Especially appealing to Guénon and later, Julius Evola, was the strict hierarchical 
nature of Hinduism. Julius Evola was a philosopher who also dabbled in magic and 
alchemy which he considered a Traditional pre-modern science.111 Evola envisioned a 
largely mythic pre-Christian Europe in a world in which authority and the divine were 
indivisible. In his famous work, Revolt Against the Modern World, Evola claimed that 
kingship and aristocracy were divinely sanctioned and necessary for any society to 
function. A tribal chief or king’s central role was to be a conduit to the divine and thus his 
“primary and essential function consisted in performing those ritual and sacrificial 
actions that constituted the center of gravity of all life…”112 For such a king, Traditional 
life was a global reality: From the Far Eastern concept of “the son of Heaven” to the 
deification of Roman emperors and the pre-modern Christian belief in divine kingship, 
authority was enshrined as a natural and sacred facet of human relations. A king or ruler 
was also a high priest and functioned as a conduit to the celestial. Thus for Evola 
authority had a metaphysical nature and temporal power proceeded from its spiritual 
authority.113 
Although Evola eventually became an advocate for Europe’s return to its own 
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pagan beliefs, the syncretic nature of Traditionalism allowed him to draw heavily on 
other religions, particularly Hinduism. In early Hinduism, Evola saw a society in which 
caste, hierarchy, religious rites and natural forms of authority were supreme over 
individualism and materialism. Invoking what he saw as a mythical, masculine and 
sacred tradition, Hinduism was one of the few religions remaining that had kept a 
measure of its Traditional truth. Furthermore, like many non-monotheist religions 
Hinduism approached time as cyclical. For Evola, existence and civilizations go through 
endless cycles of birth, growth, aging, death and rebirth. Accordingly, just like Guénon, 
Evola saw the modern world as going through a stage of Kali Yuga, in which discord, 
chaos, and vice reign supreme. 
Evola was a contemporary of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini who preached a 
mystical ideology that combined a doctrine of political elitism, masculine aristocracy, 
and Perennial Traditionalism.114 An early supporter of both Italian Fascism and National 
Socialism, he nonetheless grew weary of both ideologies. This was because Evola 
ultimately believed that while fascism and National Socialism made important strides in 
reinvigorating Europe with a cult of action, neither ideology fostered a truly Traditional 
spirituality. Rather, both movements were far too populist and, despite the apparent 
attempts by the Nazi Reich to form a new elite class of warriors such as the SS, did not 
do enough to foster a truly aristocratic principle.115 
Like Evola, Dugin fears that contemporary society exists in the Kali Yuga. In his 
2001 manifesto of the Eurasianist Movement, Dugin decried a fallen world in which 
totalitarian uniformity and consumerism are the only hallmarks of the modern life.116 
Additionally angered by the seeming political and ideological apathy of the masses, he 
wrote, “The majority of political parties and formalized social movements pursue tactical 
purposes. Practically nowhere can be found an explicit and consequent ideology capable 
to snatch man from a state of sleepy indifference, to make life worth living.”117 
It is initially self-evident that Alexander Dugin’s body of thought certainly 
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represents, in the least, fascistic tendencies. After all Dugin is a vehement opponent of 
liberalism, egalitarianism and consumerism. He has repeatedly supported Vladimir Putin 
and his repressive tactics in the hopes that Putin will lay the foundation for an 
internationally resurgent Russia. It has also been thoroughly demonstrated that Dugin is 
anything but a pacifist and is very willing to engage in war, particularly with the United 
States, if it leads to the formation of a Eurasian empire. Dugin’s plans for imperial 
expansion positively dwarf even the most ambitious plans of Nazi expansion and 
Lebensraum. Indeed, Dugin’s hatred of what he sees as the morally decaying effects of 
American hegemony matches closely with Nazism’s obsessive hatred of Jews and their 
paranoia over Jewish and Bolshevik infiltration. 
Yet in applying Griffin’s fascist minimum to Dugin’s case it can only be 
concluded that Neo-Eurasianism, while certainly sharing many traits with historical cases 
of fascism, is not necessarily a fascist doctrine. As this work has demonstrated, Dugin, 
like many fascists, yearns for a complete reconstruction of state, culture and society. 
However, while fascism has ultimately emphasized a fundamentally alternative modern 
vision of a new state, Dugin’s worldview, characterized as it is by Evola and Tradition, is 
utterly anti-modern. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were both characterized by a 
fondness for industry, efficiency and bureaucracy. The reigning aesthetic was one that 
emphasized youth, vigor, productivity and technological progress. Conversely, Dugin is 
deeply ambivalent toward any narrative of progress and even modern technology. 
In his The Fourth Political Theory Dugin describes an isolated community of Old 
Believers who live in the Ural Mountains. Here, these “fundamental conservatives” avoid 
seemingly trivial affectations such as wearing plaid.118 In addition, they only use torches 
and candles for lighting for electrical lighting is “’the light of Lucifer.’”119 They also 
scorn the eating of boiled buckwheat or the drinking of tea and coffee as “’sinful.’”120 
Dugin urges the reader not to consider these practices outdated or odd, but rather 
understand that their antagonism toward modern values is so complete that they will also 
spurn the use of modernity’s concomitant technological marvels. For these Old Believers 
rightly see that “…time is regress, and modern men are a sacrificial offering to the 
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devil.”121 For Dugin, then, it is completely acceptable and even desirable to not only 
reject modernity and any narrative of progress but to even participate in traditionalist 
religious communities that enforce this worldview. Dugin’s anti-modernism is anathema 
to fascism’s vitalist cult of technology and action which, while against certain aspects of 
modernity such as what they would describe as consumerism, hedonism and 
individualism, nonetheless allowed for an alternative vision of modernity which allowed 
technological and social innovation. On the contrary, Dugin’s anti-modernism seems to 
be a holistic critique of any form of modernism that allows for any narrative of progress, 
social and/or technological, that would lead man further away from Tradition. Thus while 
both fascism and Neo-Eurasianism can be said to be palingenetic, the former desires an 
alternative modernity, while the latter completely rejects modernity in all its forms. 
This section has argued for a complication of our understanding of Dugin’s fascis-
tic tendencies. While Neo-Eurasianism is similar to fascism in that it does call for a major 
social, cultural and national rebirth and utilizes a certain idealized myth about the past, 
fascism ultimately proposed an alternative modernity rather than a completely anti-
modern project. Conversely, Dugin questions not only democracy, egalitarianism, and 
consumerism of modernity but also the secularism, populism, and even the technological 
vitalism present in fascism as well. Thus his fundamental anti-modernism precludes him 
from the palingenetic alternative modernity present in fascism. The following chapter 
continues the argument for a nuanced understanding of Neo-Eurasianism’s alleged fas-
cism by discussing whether or not it meets the second criteria for Griffin’s fascist mini-
mum – that of ultranationalism. For Dugin, the philosophical ennui of contemporary man 
has been largely fostered by the victory of American liberal democracy and Americaniza-
tion of the cultures of the world, which he describes as an “Atlanticist tsunami.”122 In 
addition to what he sees as the death of ideology, Dugin also mourns the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, which he regards as an unmitigated disaster. The end of the Soviet Un-
ion meant the effective end of organized opposition to globalization and Americanization. 
However, rather than a restoration of the Soviet Union Dugin proposes a new political 
union, a Eurasian one. A Eurasianist empire would stretch into territories and countries 
that neither the Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union had ever ruled over. The Eurasianist 
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movement represents a supranational project that will unite many different religions and 
ethnic groups into a single empire. On the surface, Dugin’s geopolitical vision appears to 
be driven by a desire for the maximization of Russian power and influence. To some ex-
tent, that is correct. However, pregnant within Dugin’s territorial ambitions for a Eura-
sianist empire are Traditional ideas of sacred space as well as a new ideological model of 
identity. The model incorporates ideas of both civilization and the spiritual missions of 
peoples as constitutive facets of identity. The Eurasianist project ultimately posits a con-
ception of Russia by portraying Russia as an important “glue” to a greater Eurasian em-
pire, thus fulfilling its divinely-ordained mission – to be a uniter of peoples. 
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Chapter	4:	Neo‐Eurasianism:	Religious	Fundamentalism	or	Ultranationalism?	
 
In regards to the second criteria of Griffin’s fascist minimum, ultranationalism, 
Dugin’s approach to nation is complex. As has been demonstrated, Dugin clearly desires 
Russia to create a massive empire that would exceed the territorial extent of the Soviet 
Union. However, just as Traditionalism has colored Dugin’s understanding of modernity, 
so too has it influenced his understanding of nation. While Italian fascism viewed la 
Razza in largely cultural terms, Italian Fascism nonetheless took for granted the fact that 
Italians were to be the main beneficiaries of a fascist state. Indeed, while Italian Fascism 
was not explicitly racist in its doctrine, this did not stop Fascist Italy from deporting 
Slovenes to a concentration camp on the island of Rab nor exacting even harsher revenge 
against recalcitrant African natives.123 Even more explicitly than fascism in Italy, German 
National Socialism viewed the welfare of the German nation as the penultimate goal to 
strive toward. No other nation, particularly Jews, were permitted to block Germany’s 
national destiny to become a continental hegemon. In short, fascist thought argues that 
one’s nation and the state ruling and administering that nation represent the highest value. 
In opposition, Dugin proposes an understanding of the Russian nation that allows 
for its importance but only insofar as it is a spiritual liberator of Eurasia and the fomenter 
of a greater identity. Indeed, like the European New Right which proposes a new, 
supranational model of identity that transcends any extreme pride in a single nation, Neo-
Eurasianism calls for the formation of a completely new new geopolitical entity and 
identity. Concomitantly, Dugin’s proposed neo-Eurasian identity is one based on 
spirituality and Traditional thought. Dugin sees the Russian nation as a potential spark to 
unite Eurasian civilization into a greater empire that, after defeating the United States, 
will then attempt to return to Traditional hierarchy and value systems. For Dugin 
Traditional spirituality is the highest value. Given this, it is impossible to define Dugin as 
an ultranationalist like historical fascists. 
Scholars such as Marlene Lauelle and Edith Clowes have argued for a more ethnic 
or even racial understanding of Dugin’s type of nationalism. He does, after all, maintain 
that Russians are perhaps the most important part of any Eurasianist project and utilizes 
much of the same language that interwar German racists and Aryan supremacists used. 
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However, it is imperative to place Dugin’s ideas within his religious worldview. Dugin’s 
religious outlook is the most important part of his intellectual makeup. It separates him 
from the primarily Orthodox early Eurasianists and Gumilev’s racial and biological 
conception of nationhood and other forms of Russian nationalism. Instead, Dugin 
approaches nationhood through a mystical prism that posits that nations are defined by 
participation in a culture’s traditional religion and sacred geography. His Traditionalist 
worldview can be seen in what he calls The Fourth Political Theory and his mystical 
geopolitical theories. 
Dugin’s arguments for a civilizational model of history discussed in his The 
Fourth Political Theory are not purely made for the strengthening of Russian national 
power. Rather, his definition of the Russian nation and its role within a greater Eurasian 
civilization are determined by his esoteric belief in the Perennial Tradition. Dugin’s 
definition of Russian nationhood is fundamentally spiritual. Indeed, Dugin has often 
repeated his disagreement with racism and the notion of race itself. Rather, he posits that 
the Russian nation is and must be defined as a spiritually-rooted people practicing 
Orthodoxy as it remains one of the few Christian traditions that have held on to some 
Traditional truth. He argues, “Russians should realize that they are Orthodox in the first 
place.” 124  Furthermore, Russians, like all other nations, are represented by angels. 
According to Dugin’s Traditionalism, these “national angels” determine the character of 
individual nations and are representatives of “God’s thought.”125 Russia is depicted as an 
“integration angel;” a divine unifying essence that collects other national angels into a 
“universal imperial” project that protects the individuality of each of the angels. 126 
Conversely, the Anglo-Saxon West opposes it with its own type of angel called 
“mammon,” a god of greed. 127  Thus utilizing a Traditional myth-symbol complex 
grounded in esoteric theology and Orthodoxy, Dugin is attempting to create a new 
identity for the Russian nation based on Traditional, not ethnic criteria. 
Taken as a whole, Dugin’s blueprint for a Eurasian empire could lead to nothing 
but enormous amounts of strife and bloodshed as the map is redrawn and empires are 
carved out. It is a fundamental manifestation of an apocalyptic worldview that sees an 
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inevitable armed conflict between two spiritual forces, one represented by Western 
mercantilism, individualism and rationalism and the other by Eastern spirituality, 
rootedness, and organic community. Thus, while Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics is a 
cynical and dangerous manifesto, it is also a representation of his own mystical 
Traditional worldview embodied by how he and other Traditionalists have understood the 
sacral nature of geography. 
In Traditionalism and other esoteric belief systems, geography has often conveyed 
important symbolic and spiritual meanings. Accordingly, the location of a space often 
bore a transcendent essence that manifested itself in the land’s occupants. Julius Evola in 
particular articulated a vision of history according to sacred space. Indeed, it is Evola’s 
ideas and their espousal by Alexander Dugin that have caused scholars such as Laruelle 
to see a racist component in Dugin’s body of thought. Evola applied similar ideas similar 
to those of the vehemently racist and anti-Semitic Ariosophists of the interwar period in 
Germany. Typified by individuals such as Guido von List and Lanz von Liebenfels, 
Ariosophists combined esoteric mysticism and racism to articulate their version of world 
history. In brief, many Ariosophists believed, in some way or another, in the divinity of 
Aryan man and that the Aryan people had recently been subjected to racial miscegenation 
and moral decay through the advent of effeminizing democracy. 128  Many of them 
believed that the Aryan people originated in lands to the far north, sometimes called 
Thule or Hyperborea. Before being poisoned by modern democracy, the Aryans had 
brought culture to the world and a natural order based on racial castes.129 
Evola maintained that during a remote prehistoric golden age, a great northern 
Arctic homeland of wise people had once existed known as Hyperborea. A “spiritual 
disaster” led to a major tilt in the Earth’s axis, which forced the Hyperborean people to 
flee. They left for North America and northern Siberia, and later to a now lost continent 
of Atlantis in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, eventually spreading to South America 
and places in Africa, and Asia; thus peoples who carried on a “Northern” spirituality 
existed all around the globe. A key aspect of Evola’s Traditionalist thought was his 
conception of “Northern” and “Southern” spiritual features in the various peoples of the 
world. “Northern” peoples tended to embody a religious, masculine and Traditional 
understanding of nature. Conversely, “Southern” spirituality, associated with the moon 
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and femininity, was largely decadent, materialistic and democratic.130 However, this was 
not an entirely ethnic distinction; “Southern” peoples could embrace a “Northern” 
spirituality and vice versa. 
Dugin has also utilized the image of Hyperborea in his writings. His publishing 
house, Arctogaia is named after a mythic Arctic continent inspired by the imagery of the 
interwar Ariosophists. 131  However, like Evola, he analyzes the Hyperborean myth 
through a Traditionalist viewpoint. Nevertheless Dugin has also argued for a spiritual 
understanding of geography. He maintains that ultimately the secrets of the universe can 
be unlocked by engaging in Traditional sciences. In his essay From Sacred Geography to 
Geopolitics, Dugin describes his geopolitical “science” as a necessarily modern rendition 
of a Traditional science, sacred geography. Just as alchemy, a sacred art used in 
Traditional rituals, has become desacralized through chemistry, so too has modern 
geopolitics become a profane study that does not grasp the essential spiritual struggle that 
exists in the modern world. 132  He characterizes this struggle as an ancient struggle 
between the Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy. The former, according to Dugin, can be 
identified today by its practice of a “southern” spirituality. It is exemplified by modern 
liberalism, rationalism, individualism, consumerism and metropolitanism, and is 
embodied by the United States and its allies. Conversely, the Tellurocracy can be 
identified by its rootedness, spirituality and religion, community, and hierarchy and is 
embodied by most of the Eurasian peoples, in particular the Russians who are heirs to the 
spiritual truths passed down from Hyperborea.133 The sacred meaning of the cardinal 
direction of where a civilization is located also helps determine its character. As the 
United States is Western, it is a “country of death” in which the sun, symbolic of 
Perennial Tradition, goes to set.134 On the other hand, the East is “the Land of the Spirit,” 
an “Eden” where the sun ascends.135 
Alexander Dugin’s beliefs about sacred geography and lost continents are truly 
bizarre. However, they are a manifestation of how deeply embedded his belief in the 
Perennial Tradition is. While Laruelle is correct to point out that Evola and Dugin both 
use a similar type of narrative to that of the Ariosophists, it is important to remember that 
                                                 
130 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Black Sun, chapter 3, Ebook. 
131 Heiser, 53. 
132 Alexander Dugin, From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics, < http://evrazia.info/article/416>. 
133 Dugin, From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics, < http://evrazia.info/article/416>. 
134 Dugin, From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics, < http://evrazia.info/article/416>. 
135 Dugin, From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics, < http://evrazia.info/article/416>. 
59 
 
 
Dugin and Evola approach the idea of Hyperborea through a specifically spiritual, not 
biological, prism. As Nicholas Goodrick points out, “Evola tended to see ‘spirituality’ as 
the prior determinant of a culture rather than its ethnic, racial population.”136 Thus, when 
Evola speaks of Hyperborea he is appraising it as a prehistorical font of spiritual wisdom 
and Tradition, not the homeland of a biologically superior race. In the same vein, Dugin 
uses the idea of Hyperborea in his myth-symbol complex not to denote Russia and its 
“Northern-ness” as the Aryan heirs to racial supermen, but rather as the heirs to a 
primordial Perennial Tradition. 
This chapter has argued that it is possible to interpret Dugin’s imperial project as a 
fundamentally Traditional and spiritual project and that he is genuinely earnest when he 
calls for a Eurasian empire that will support and protect the rights of all the traditional 
peoples and religions within its borders. Thus, it can be said that Neo-Eurasianism does 
not meet the second criteria of a fascist minimum because it is not ultranationalist as it 
sees the strengthening of Russia as good but only insofar as it facilitates the elevation of 
other peoples into a larger supranational identity. Indeed, the following chapter will 
demonstrate that it is for this reason that Dugin has repeatedly come under attack by 
contemporary New Rightists and American white nationalists who have hitherto seen 
Dugin as a racial ally against multiculturalism, liberalism, and globalization. Contrary to 
some New Rightists who are simultaneously avowed Traditionalists and racists, Dugin 
has repeatedly argued against biological race as a meaningful factor in understanding 
culture, politics or history. The contemporary New Right is not a monolith. Rather, it is a 
conglomeration of groups and individual thinkers who engage in a Gramscian strategy of 
metapolitics. They generally agree on an anti-American, anti-egalitarian, and anti-
materialist outlook on the world. Furthermore, they propose an “Identitarian” project 
aimed at protecting individual ethnic cultures from cultural homogenization.137 Yet the 
movement is rife with internal conflicts, ranging from how they should adjust their 
metapolitical strategy over time to what the world would look like if the New Right 
actually gained the cultural hegemony it pursues. Furthermore, the New Right can largely 
be considered racist, or in the very least as a philosophy that believes race is a 
biologically important, even supreme, factor in understanding human society. However, 
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recently some thinkers, including Benoist himself, have come under fire for doctrinal 
impurity, particularly by American New Rightists. Furthermore, by discussing the 
debates present within New Right discourse, we can more fully grasp Dugin’s own stance 
on race by examining the criticisms levelled at him by open biological racists. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Dugin, Race and the Racist New Right 
 
It is important to briefly take note of the similarities between the New Right and 
historical fascism and National Socialism. It is essential to again emphasize that the 
movement represents a very broad umbrella of dissident rightists who do not necessarily 
agree on much. While participating in a general anti-liberal and anti-egalitarian 
metapolitical conflict, New Rightists can be neo-fascists, National Socialists, monarchists 
and believers in a democratic White or European republic. In the same vein, the 
movement is represented by socialists, corporatists, free market capitalists and even 
anarchists. Thus it is difficult to declare that all New Rightists can be understood as more 
or less neo-Nazis. That being said, the memory of Hitler and the Third Reich remains 
strong to many New Rightists and particularly racist White Nationalist webzines such as 
Counter-Currents and Alternative Right.138 Many of its members such as Greg Johnson 
have demonstrated a nostalgia for Hitler and have claimed that Hitler was right and that 
Jews remain the ultimate menace to Europe and European peoples.139 In addition, Hitler 
is described by Johnson as a man who utilized totalitarianism only because he himself 
was fighting Jewish totalitarianism – that is, the Soviet Union and Bolsheviks. This 
approach to Hitler has been similarly utilized by much of the New Right. . In the same 
vein race has played a very important role in many New Rightists worldview over the 
years. For the likes of Michael O’Meara, Greg Johnson and Guillame Faye biological 
race can be considered the major constitutive part of identity and Hitler’s struggle was a 
just race war between White Europe and Jewish domination. Indeed, one could argue that 
the fundamental difference between much of the racist core of the New Right and 
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National Socialism is one of methology; the former sought to attain power through 
violence, political terror and participation within the political system, while the latter 
seeks to ultimately attain cultural hegemony and dominate public discourse. Outliers who 
do not agree with the racist core of the New Right such as Alexander Dugin and Alain de 
Benoist himself have been attacked by various New Rightists for their lack of racial 
solidarity over the years and have even been considered agent provocateurs. 
In New Culture, New Right the White Nationalist Michael O’Meara decries what 
he considers to be a blatant step backwards in the movement’s metapolitical struggle. Up 
until 1998, GRECE emphatically opposed any attempts by the authorities to confer legal 
status to North African immigrants as a separate legal category on the grounds that this 
action would threaten France’s identity.140 However, GRECE reversed course by adopting 
a more “communitarian” approach which favored the public recognition of non-French 
communities in order to facilitate the survival of the non-French immigrants’ culture.141 
Thus, according to O’Meara, began a series of intellectual retreats in which the French 
Nouvelle Droite began to exchange its original attempts at gaining cultural hegemony by 
diluting its ideas in favor of a much humbler mission of simply “interpreting” the 
present. 142  By not continuing with the call for the expulsion of the non-European 
immigrants, according to the more determined New Rightists, Benoist and GRECE 
essentially gave up much of their racial nationalism for a “communitarian qualified 
multiculturalism.”143 
Correspondingly, Guillamme Faye wrote his book Why We Fight as a reaction to 
what he saw as the weakening resolve of GRECE.144 In the work, Faye rails against the 
“system friendly” intellectuals of the right who only claim to have the best interests of 
the white race in mind.145 He goes on to argue that the contemporary decadence of the 
French government, which he characterizes as a “multi-racialist mafia,” will lead to 
“genetic ruin” for all of Europe.146 
Despite Dugin’s protestations of good faith towards similarly-minded New 
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Rightists, others within the movement do not consider him a member. In an interview 
with Open Revolt, Dugin argued that while he accepts White Nationalists only as 
common short-term allies against unipolarity and liberalism, he recognizes differences of 
opinion with them: 
“More than this, I can’t defend Whites when they are in opposition to non-Whites 
because, being White and Indo-European myself, I recognize the differences of other 
ethnic groups as being a natural thing, and do not believe in any hierarchy among 
peoples, because there is not and cannot be any common, universal measure by which to 
measure and compare the various forms of ethnic societies or their value systems.”147 
In the article, “The Magic Disillusion of a Nationalist Intellectual,” Dugin talks 
about what he calls the “myth of the solidarity of a single white race.”148  In it he 
described the belief in a single, unitary white or Aryan race as a “utopia that could only 
lead to the Holocaust of the Jews…” as well as the Slavs.149 He continues, 
 
“The remains of the Third Reich are a basis for this miserable, contradictory and 
completely false conception. The Anglo-Saxon world is one sociopolitical and cultural 
reality. The inhabitants of Central Europe are something different. The Eastern world of 
Orthodox Christianity and Slavs is a third reality. I am certain that many non-white 
peoples of Eurasia are a thousandfold closer to us in spirit and culture than Americans. In 
this question I am 100% affirmative with the visions of [Lev] Gumilev.”150 
 
With this statement Dugin not only asserts that race is not a meaningful factor in 
categorizing peoples but also proposes an ethno-cultural interpretation of Gumilev’s 
theories, rather than a biological one. Yet again, Dugin attacked race as a defining factor 
in national identity during a lecture in which he characterized race as a “social 
construct.” 151  Dugin has also called for the end of “chauvinism, Eurocentrism, 
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universalism, racism, [and] xenophobia…152 Despite his protestations against racism, he 
nonetheless considers himself an ally to the New Right and believes that the New Right à 
la Benoist is more or less consistent with his own fourth political theory.153 
Dugin’s declarations that race is an unimportant or even non-existent factor when 
assessing identity has proven troublesome for many other New Rightists. For some this 
may be linked in Dugin’s overt links to Traditionalism. It is of course true that 
Traditionalism and Julius Evola have been an important intellectual inspiration for racist 
thinkers. The recently deceased Jonathan Bowden, a self-described Nietzschean, in a talk 
hosted by members of the New Right in London on June 5, 2010 lectured on the 
importance of Evola’s thought on the contemporary New Right.154 Bowden argues that 
Evola and Tradition have been instrumental in infusing the New Right with a spiritual 
and intellectual backbone that has allowed the New Right to “ride the tiger” of 
modernity.155 However, Bowden warns that Traditionalism, placed in the wrong hands, 
could lead to a dangerous “…sort of universalism at times or a neo-liberalism 
occasionally where all cultures are of value, where all are ‘interesting,’ where all are 
slightly interchangeable.”156 In other words, Bowden warns that Traditionalism has the 
potential to be read as a pro-multicultural worldview. In a similar fashion, Guillame Faye, 
an avowed reader of Evola, also warned against Tradition. Faye urges caution against 
“Evolianism,” which taken too far, “turns away from practical, tangible issues,” 
presumably the Identitarian struggle.157 
This hostility towards Evola has its roots in history. Furthermore, Evola was 
deeply disappointed with Nazism’s biological determinism and racism. Indeed, an 
important note must be made concerning Evola, the history of Nazism and the subject of 
race. Evola certainly espoused a fundamentally anti-Semitic worldview. However, an 
essential distinction that must be made is that Evola was principally against what he 
called “Semitic thought.” 158  That is ideas such as egalitarianism, materialism, and 
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secularism entertained by many Jews as well as those who had a similar “Semitic” 
mentality. Countering the “Semitic” mentality was an “Aryan” mindset that valued honor, 
loyalty, hierarchy and tradition. Race to Evola was not the biological or ethnic substance 
of a group of people, but rather was a spiritual phenomenon. While ethnic groups carried 
a “memory” of a spiritual race, there was nothing inherently noble or superior about an 
Aryan man. Rather, only by adopting the values of an Aryan mindset could someone 
become an Aryan. Simply because a man came from Nordic stock did not necessarily 
mean he was “Aryan” of spirit.159  Indeed, he scoffed at the idea that a contemporary 
German street sweeper would consider himself better than an African king purely on the 
basis of his white skin.160 Indeed, Jews could be spiritually superior to many non-Jews. 
While Hitler’s definition of Aryan largely included those only of a Germanic ethnic 
background, Evola maintained that Hitler himself was not Aryan as he was a demagogue 
and populist.161 Hitler’s populist National Socialist movement was “proletarianized” and 
accepted only a “completely plebeian” concept of race. 162  Opposed to ethnic anti-
Semitism, Evola argued that the primary indicator of human character was not racial or 
genetic makeup, but rather a person’s spiritual life and outlook.163 Therefore in Evola’s 
writings an “Aryan” or “Jew” should not be understood as purely biological entities, “but 
as categories denoting ‘typical attitudes which were not necessarily present in all 
individuals of Aryan or Jewish blood.’”164 This is not to say that Evola’s ideas were not 
deeply wrong, but his distinction between spiritual and biological race allows for the 
possibility for someon like Dugin to read Evola’s ideas on race as primarily religious and 
otherworldly, rather than biological. 
Various authors of the New Right have directly targeted Dugin as an enemy of the 
movement over the subject of race. The online webzine Counter-Currents has been a 
gathering place of mostly Anglophone New Rightists to publish articles about race, 
culture, politics, and religion since 2010. Headed by its editor-in-chief, Greg Johnson, 
Counter-Currents describes itself as having taken its intellectual cues from the anti-
modernism of René Guénon and the ethnic and racial nationalism of the European New 
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Right.165 Counter-Currents and similar North American New Right metapolitical organs 
have provided mouthpieces to New Right intellectuals who claim Dugin is not truly an 
ally of theirs or is at least only minimally connected to the broader New Right ideology. 
In the article “Dugin Contra Racism,” Giuliano Adriano Malvicini maintains that 
Dugin is not a racist but a postmodern moral relativist. Malvicini complains that Dugin’s 
“incessant denunciations of racism” are aimed purely at the West without regard to the 
racism present in other parts of the world.166 Additionally, Malvicini argues that Dugin’s 
arguments against National Socialism in his The Fourth Political Theory are 
fundamentally flawed as he accepts the dominant, and (Malvicini maintains) wrong, 
liberal narrative that German National Socialism was fundamentally against other races. 
Absurdly, Malvicini says, National Socialism was simply pro-German.167 
Some New Rightists have changed their opinion of Dugin and his ideas over time. 
In 2004, Michael O’Meara described Dugin as a “Russian Identitarian” who shared the 
same worldview as himself.168 However, in an article written in 2013, O’Meara presents 
Dugin as a thinker who is “difficult to pigeonhole” but nonetheless antithetical to the 
New Right project. Despite the anti-egalitarianist and anti-materialist spirit of much of 
Dugin’s work, O’Meara is completely against Dugin’s Eurasian geopolitical goals and 
what they seem to represent – multi-culturualism. 169  O’Meara argues that, despite 
Dugin’s claims that a Eurasian empire under Russia would protect the individual cultures 
of various ethnic groups, O’Meara contends that this ethnopluralism would only lead to 
another, slightly more localized “anti-cultural” form of multi-culturalism in which Jews, 
Muslims, Turks, Mongols, and Slavs would live together.170 Thus Dugin’s Eurasianist 
project is not unlike the communitarian concessions made by Benoist over immigration. 
Indeed, O’Meara goes so far to argue that the likes of Benoist and Dugin and their 
“miscegenating principles of global cosmopolitanism,” are dangerous to both the New 
Right and Europe.171 According to thinkers like O’Meara, Dugin’s Eurasianism “mixes 
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white and yellow” and is anathema to any ethno-nationalist project.172 
Greg Johnson has also come out to attack Alexander Dugin’s writings. Contrary to 
many other New Rightists who hope for the economic as well as political unification into 
a more or less federalized white Europe, Johnson anticipates that a victorious New Right 
will oversee the creation of dozens of smaller states. These white ethno-states, 
determined by plebiscite, would be based on ethnic, cultural, and religious factors.173 He 
describes Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist project as fundamentally against smaller, white, 
nationalities. Instead, Johnson views it as more or less a ploy to resurrect the Soviet 
Union in territory, if not necessarily in its constitutive spirit.174 Similarly, according to 
Johnson, Dugin’s call for multi-polarity is just another form of hegemony, leading, if 
successful, to the creation of a multi-racial empire that is more concerned with state 
power than advancing ethnic, that is, white, concerns. 
Although the New Right has not proposed a united, very specific geopolitical 
project, some have suggested plans like that of Greg Johnson, in which Europeans and 
European-Americans form small, ethnically and culturally homogenous states that rely 
on the larger countries such as France or the United Kingdom with nuclear deterrents to 
protect the smaller white states.175 Other, perhaps the majority, foresee the formation of a 
somewhat loosely administered but united European empire. Guillaume Faye, for 
instance, calls for the formation of an all-white empire of “Euro-Siberia” that would 
stretch from Iceland to Siberia.176 Yet Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist project seems 
to fly in the face of these members of the New Right. Contrary to any all-white 
supranational project proposed by other New Rightists, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasian empire 
would include the direct annexation of Mongolia into Russia proper. Furthermore, 
Eurasia’s expansion into northern and western China would certainly lead to a larger non-
European Chinese and Central Asian population within Russia. In addition, in exchange 
for the territorial enlargement of Dugin’s Eurasia at the expense of China, China would 
be granted suzerainty over the majority white country of Australia.177  
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This chapter has argued that given Dugin’s open discussion on how he envisions a 
Eurasian empire, it is not likely that he has the goal of creating a racially homogenous 
community of nations in mind. Rather, it seems far more likely that Dugin truly does not 
see biological race as a meaningful constitutive part of any form of identity. Indeed, as 
this study has demonstrated, the overt lack of racism in Dugin’s thinking has caused 
some within the New Right to question his presence in the movement altogether. 
Furthermore, the demonstrable lack of ultranationalism in Neo-Eurasianism, in which the 
welfare of the Russian nation is viewed as the highest good, further disqualifies Dugin 
from the second requirement of Griffin’s fascist minimum. 
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Conclusion	
 
As recently as October, 2014, Alexander Dugin was scheduled to participate in a 
conference in Budapest, Hungary hosted by the National Policy Institute, an American 
New Right think tank. Here Dugin, along with Greg Johnson and others of the New Right 
were planning on delivering talks and lectures on the state of the movement. However, in 
late September, the Hungarian government banned the conference from taking place.178 
In response, Alexander Dugin instead posted a Youtube video of the lecture that he would 
have given, had the conference taken place. In the video, Dugin rehashes much of what 
he has already articulated in his theoretical works on the Fourth Political Theory. He 
argues that the New Right must reject all forms of racism, which he argues is an Anglo-
Saxon creation and includes biological racism, eurocentrism and the “racist” universality 
of liberalism and Marxism. At the same time he maintained that there is not one universal 
humanity but a collection of various humanities defined by “civilization.179” Thus Europe 
and Eurasia, based on different civilizational models, should remain allies to fight against 
their common enemy, the United States’ global hegemony, but should respect one 
another’s civilizational differences. These civilizations, however, are not just cultural or 
political but also fundamentally spiritual. As has been discussed, these civilizations, like 
religions, are manifestations of various facets of a far distant divine truth. Thus Dugin 
signals once again that a collective civilizational and Traditional worldview animates and 
gives meaning to national and supranational identities, not biological race or ethnicity. 
Given his repeated declarations of anti-racism and a disbelief in biological race, it 
is curious that he seems to remain an accepted member of the New Right despite an 
increasing number of protests against him within the ranks. Part of this can be explained 
by the fact that, even if Dugin is not a racist, as many are now realizing, he still 
represents a popular anti-liberal academic within Russia whose views nonetheless share 
an anti-egalitarianism and anti-Americanism similar to that of the rest of the New Right. 
Concomitantly, a Eurasianist Russia, even if not sharing the biological racism shared by 
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many within the New Right, would nonetheless constitute a powerful enemy against 
American global power. 
This project has dealt almost entirely with the ideas espoused by Alexander 
Dugin. Our understanding of his true intentions have been limited due to the fact that he 
holds no political office nor is his ideology of Neo-Eurasianism officially a part of 
Putin’s program. As it stands, Dugin himself has remained ambivalent on measuring the 
amount of real impact his ideas have had on Russian politics. On one hand he has 
proudly pointed out the fact that his Foundations of Geopolitics remains a popular book 
for many Russian officers and policy makers. Dugin has gone so far to contend that his 
ideas have influenced Vladimir Putin.180 On the other hand, he has also claimed that 
Putin is ultimately a political pragmatist and has little time for ideology.181 Thus, while 
Dugin has repeatedly argued that Putin stands the best chance of successfully countering 
global American hegemony and creating a greater Russian empire, he also worries that 
Putin’s pragmatism and lack of philosophical convictions will only lead Russia towards a 
slow but definite slide into liberal democracy.182 As of late, Dugin’s rhetoric has been 
somewhat radicalized. As was stated in the first chapter, Dugin has called for the 
annihilation and “genocide” of Ukrainian dissidents. On August 23, 2014 Dugin posted 
an inflammatory note on the Russian-language equivalent of Facebook, VKontakte. 
Dugin railed, “Ukraine should be cleared of the idiots. Genocide of the cretins is 
suggested. The evil cretins are closed to the Voice of the Logos, and deadly with all their 
incredible stupidity. I do not believe that these are Ukrainians. Ukrainians are beautiful 
Slavic people. This kind of appeared out of manholes as a bastard race.”183 While the 
word “genotsid” denotes genocide and is certainly indicative of an extremely violent 
mentality, it also important to note that Dugin does not call for wholesale genocide. 
Rather, Dugin attacks specifically Ukrainian “cretins” who, according to him, serve their 
Atlanticist and American masters.184 Indeed, Dugin has frequently expounded a belief, 
popular among Russian rightists and conservatives, that the ousting of Yanukovich was a 
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calculated move spearheaded by the United States in order to expand its influence further 
and further towards Russia. 185  Nevertheless, Dugin’s recent violent outburst against 
Ukrainians could be a manifestation of a more radical and disingenuous train of thought 
that is not present in much of his writings. It is possible that eventually Neo-Eurasianism 
will reveal itself to be genuinely fascist and Dugin’s multiculturalist language proven to 
be just a façade. However, it is my contention that at this time most of the evidence, as 
discussed above, points to Dugin being an earnest Traditionalist who is genuinely against 
genocide.  
It goes without saying that regardless of Dugin’s stance on race and whether or 
not he can be considered a fascist Neo-Eurasianism is a genuinely dangerous doctrine to 
world peace and is a threat to international stability. For the likes of the Russian 
philosopher and radical rightist Alexander Dugin, a successful outcome for Russia in 
Ukraine is hopefully just a small segment of a much larger geopolitical project. While 
Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory remain largely a part of fringe political 
discourse, it is not impossible that it will not gain traction with both elites and common 
Russian citizens in the future. Given that Dugin’s geopolitical and illiberal worldview 
virtually demands a global war against the United States and its allies, one can only hope 
that Dugin’s fears come true. 
In conclusion, Dugin does not wholly meet the criteria of a fascist minimum. This 
is not to say that Neo-Eurasianism represents any less of a dangerous ideology to 
international peace or liberal democracy. Dugin’s philosophy certainly shares the “fascist 
negations” that include anti-egalitarianism, anti-democracy and anti-liberalism. Neo-
Eurasianism also shares a similar palingenetic worldview to that of fascist movements. 
However, while fascism’s national rebirth is an alternative form of modernity that 
emphasizes some aspects of modernity and discards others, Dugin’s anti-modernity is 
profoundly reactionary. Correspondingly, while a central tenet of fascism is 
ultranationalism and extreme pride in a single nation, Dugin proposes a supranational 
project that would place the Russian nation along with numerous other peoples in a larger 
empire. While it is true that historically Russian imperialists have often utilized a 
messianic narrative in order to “liberate” their smaller neighbors, it is important to 
remember that for a follower of Traditionalism, as Dugin surely is, religious truth, not 
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nation, is the most important value to strive toward. Russia, in short, is an important facet 
of Dugin’s project, but it is not an end in itself. 
This study has also argued against interpreting Alexander Dugin’s Neo-
Eurasianism as a more or less ethnic or racist, fascist blueprint. Despite his membership 
within the New Right it is important to note that even its founder, Alain de Benoist, has 
come under attack for doctrinal impurities when it came to discussions of race and “white 
survival.” One of the major problems with contemporary academic discussion of Dugin 
and the New Right is a tendency to characterize the project as something of a monolith 
rather than a deeply fragmented conglomeration of similar yet competing sub-ideologies. 
Dugin shares the anti-Americanism, anti-democratic and anti-liberal tendencies of the 
New Right. He, along with the New Right, are intellectual heirs of Traditional thought 
and the Conservative Revolution to one degree or another. Yet Dugin has repeatedly 
articulated a fundamentally different view of identity than the New Right and fascism. 
Dugin has offered many protestations against biological racism. His geopolitical 
visions seem to discount race or ethnicity and elevate cultural, historical and spiritual 
factors in his Eurasian project. Furthermore he has espoused a Traditional worldview that 
discounts biological race. Dugin’s worldview is colored by something else. His ideology 
is not grounded upon racial or ethnic notions of identity, despite his fascistic leanings. 
Rather, Dugin’s ideology is grounded in the esoteric belief in a Perennial Tradition of 
which Orthodox Christianity and other Eurasian traditional religions represent facets of a 
single divine truth. Combining a myth-symbol complex utilizing a mixture of 
Traditionalist belief in Russia’s messianic need to unify and protect other peoples with 
Orthodoxy and a reverence for Russia’s simpler past, Dugin has created a new identity 
for the Russian nation; that of the divinely-inspired unifying force to bring Russia and the 
rest of the world not to Orthodoxy, but to the Perennial Tradition.  
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Annex 1: Glossary 
  
Ariosophy – Also known as Armanism, Ariosophy is a term used to describe the 
racist and esoteric writings of mystics such as Guido von List (1848 – 1919) and Jorg 
Lanz von Liebensfels (1874 – 1954). Ariosophy can be understood as a broad philosophy 
that maintained that Aryans, or Nordic peoples, are scientifically and/or spiritually 
superior beings to non-Aryans, particularly Jews. Ariosophy maintained that Aryan man 
originated in a fantastical northern continent known sometimes as Atlantis, Hyperborea 
or Thule. Organizing themselves in small lodges in Austria during the late nineteenth 
century and continuing into the interwar years, Ariosophists were fascinated with 
Germanic paganism and runes, seeing in the ancient practices of their Germanic 
ancestors a means of revitalizing modern Aryans. Ariosophy has been likened to a proto-
Nazi ideology as its esoteric and mystical understanding of history combined to color 
much of the symbolism and eugenics policies of Nazism. 
Conservative Revolution – The Conservative Revolution was a dissident rightist 
intellectual movement that originated during the Weimar Republic. While opposed to 
what it saw as the moral decadence of modern bourgeois values and the rising communist 
tide as the Nazis, Conservative Revolutionary thinkers such as Oswald Spengler (1880 – 
1936) and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876 – 1925) were also skeptical of the 
populism and demagoguery present in Nazism and other fascist movements. 
Conservative Revolutionaries tended to argue for a “Prussian” socialism in which 
traditional elites were restored but the nation would be united under an authoritarian ruler 
through revolutionary means. Unlike National Socialism, the Conservative Revolution 
espoused a cultural rather than biological anti-Semitism and a deep distrust of what they 
considered to be vulgar mass politics. 
Fascism – A radical and extreme political ideology that combines a belief in the 
need for national rebirth, a renewal of cultural values and fervent ultranationalism. 
Typified by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, fascist movements have historically 
emphasized a vehement disdain for liberalism, Marxism, materialism, modernity and 
traditional elites. At the same time, fascism has often represented a modern reaction to 
modernity by further centralizing the state, displacing traditional elites, secularizing 
politics and culture, and introducing (pseudo-)scientific understandings of race. 
Identitarianism – is a philosophical understanding of reality that holds that 
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cultural and/or racial identity and its preservation are of the utmost importance. 
Originating in Cold War Europe, the term has become synonymous with the ideas 
espoused by Alain de Benoist and other members of the European New Right. 
Modernity – For the purposes of this work, modernity is defined as the cultural 
and social value system that has existed since the advent of the Enlightenment in the 
Western World. These values include rationalism over mysticism, science and 
materialism over spirituality, economics over politics, and the importance of individual 
identity over organic communities. These values have become antithetical to New Right 
thinkers such as Alain de Benoist, Alexander Dugin and others who see modernity not as 
a positive, progressive step towards something better but a backwards slide into hedonist 
consumerism. 
Palingenesis – is a concept of rebirth utilized in philosophy, theology, biology 
and politics. For the purposes of this project, Palingenesis is understood as the first part 
of Roger Griffin’s concept of the “fascist minimum” – the prerequisites necessary for a 
movement or ideology to be considered fascist. In this sense, palingenesis is defined as a 
belief in the fundamental need for a national society to undergo a complete rebirth in 
order to cast off decadent values and in order to be reinvigorated with a cult of action, 
masculinity and hierarchy. Although utilizing a fundamentally anti-modern palingenetic 
vision, fascist movements have always ultimately created, or attempted to create, a 
fundamentally new and modern society in which liberalism, egalitarianism, 
individualism, and consumerism are repressed but other modern values such as a faith in 
technology, secularism, and new rather than traditional political and cultural leaders. 
Particularism – is a term often utilized by Alexander Dugin and like-minded 
thinkers who argue that the United States and its alleged global military-cultural 
hegemony threatens the individuality of various particular cultures and peoples. 
Particularism, then, is a call to preserve the individual characteristics of culturally distinct 
peoples, small and large, against what is considered to be the homogenizing effects of 
modern American consumerist and decadent culture. 
Perennial Tradition – The Perennial Tradition, also known as Guénonian 
Traditionalism or simply Traditionalism, is the esoteric religious belief that virtually all 
the world’s religions were once combined into a universal divine truth. This truth was 
encapsulated in a divinely-ordained human hierarchy in which the priest-king acted as a 
natural intercessor between inferior castes and the divine. However, with time and 
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especially with the advent of modernity, sacred traditional values and practices such as 
traditional hierarchy and gender roles were inverted thus leading man only further away 
from the divine. Popularized by the mystic-scholars René Guénon (1886 – 1951) and 
Julius Evola (1898 – 1974), Traditionalism is a pessimistic anti-modern (see: modernity) 
worldview that holds that Western society, indeed most of mankind, is in spiritual and 
moral decline. Traditionalism maintains that only through initiation in one of the 
religious paths that still have some connection to the primordial divine, such as Hinduism 
or a form of paganism, or through radical political, social and cultural reconstruction can 
man be reconnected with the natural, divinely-ordained order. Traditionalism maintains 
that there is no higher value than the participation in Traditional religions. Today, 
Alexander Dugin is perhaps one of the most known practitioners of Traditionalism. 
Sacred Geography – A belief in the sacral nature of geographical space is present 
within the writings of both Ariosophists and Traditionalists. For instance, both Ariosophy 
and Tradition argue that during some primordial past a group of pure beings who held 
sacred wisdom lived in a far northern continent and later travelled and settled throughout 
the rest of the planet. However, unlike Ariosophists who claim that these settlers were 
racially and genetically superior Aryans, Traditionalists maintain that these beings were 
simply spiritually superior due to their advanced knowledge of the natural and divinely-
ordained hierarchy that they then bestowed to the rest of humanity. The similarities 
between Ariosophist and Traditionalist definitions of sacred geography have led some 
scholars to conflate the two. 
Ultranationalism – The Second prerequisite of Roger Griffin’s “fascist 
minimum,” ultranationalism in a movement is exemplified by an extreme pride and faith 
in one’s nation. Furthermore, ultranationalism is typified by a belief that one’s nation and 
its welfare represent the highest good for an individual or community to strive for. 
White Nationalism – A nationalist project that wishes to see the creation of either 
a large empire or collection of small states based on the premise that all racially white, or 
native European, peoples should live together. This term has frequently been utilized by 
White Power terrorists such as members of the violent group The Order as well as right 
wing thinkers such as Greg Johnson. 
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